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ABSTRACT 
 
Uneasy Waters: The Night Riders at Reelfoot Lake, Tennessee, 1908 
 
 
 
by 
 
Jama McMurtery Grove 
 
 
On October 19, 1908, night riders at Reelfoot Lake, Tennessee kidnapped and murdered Captain 
Quentin Rankin, an attorney and shareholder in the West Tennessee Land Company.  The 
murder made national news, with coverage emphasizing the night riders’ demand for fishing 
rights.  In response, Governor Malcolm Patterson called out the militia to suppress the uprising 
and advocated for state acquisition of the lake as a means to prevent further violence.  In the 
accepted historical narrative, the uprising at Reelfoot Lake represents an example of rural 
resistance to the threat that modernization posed to traditional access rights but ignores much of 
the violence that proceeded Rankin’s murder.  When contextualized within local conditions and 
Tennessee’s political climate, the night riders’ crimes reveal a targeted attack on the exploding 
cotton economy in which the lake became the arena where farmers contested the agricultural, 
social, and political changes that accompanied this new economic system.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the languid waters and unyielding cypress trees of Reelfoot Lake State Park belie 
both the violence that created the lake and the violence that occurred in the region surrounding it 
nearly a century later, but the park’s very existence owes much to its violent past.  On October 
19, 1908, after months of escalating violence in the region of Tennessee and Kentucky 
surrounding Reelfoot Lake, night riders kidnapped two prominent, white attorneys, murdered 
one, and allowed the other to escape.  Accounts of the attack filled the front pages of state and 
national papers.  In response, Tennessee Governor Malcolm Rice Patterson suspended his re-
election campaign, called out the state militia, and traveled to Reelfoot to oversee the 
investigation into the kidnapping and murder.  By the conclusion of the inquiry, over 300 West 
Tennesseans had been detained for questioning regarding night riding and six had been found 
guilty of murder and sentenced to death.  Moreover, Governor Patterson had begun actively 
seeking to bring the lake under state control in order to squelch the conflict over lake access and 
fishing rights that had seemingly motivated the violence.  The purchase of the lake became an act 
of Progressive Era conservation and a first step toward the creation of state parks in Tennessee, 
but underlying the narrative remained the claim that the violence Patterson sought to quell 
related directly to the lake.  Recent historical scholarship on similarly violent episodes and new 
interpretations of acts of environmental conservation suggest that a reconsideration of events at 
Reelfoot is in order.  More than merely a matter of lake access and fishing rights, the events at 
Reelfoot Lake resulted from the complex interaction of economic, social, and cultural forces 
specific to the Reelfoot Lake area and to the early twentieth century.  These events reflect in 
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microcosm the relationships of race, class, and culture in the Progressive Era and complicate the 
notion of conservation by challenging the roots of conservation at Reelfoot.   
Reelfoot Lake was created between December 1811 and February 1812, when a series of 
powerful earthquakes jolted the region with sufficient force to disrupt the flow of the Mississippi 
River.  When the tremors quieted, the shallow waters of newly created Reelfoot Lake submerged 
over 25,000 acres of land.  For decades, residents treated the lake as a shared natural resource, 
but the earlier titles issued by North Carolina and Tennessee remained in effect, changing hands 
through sale and inheritance.  A landowner first attempted to claim Reelfoot Lake as private 
property during the 1860s, but he dropped the claim when residents resisted.  Between 1898 and 
1905, residents blocked efforts to claim private ownership of Reelfoot Lake through a series of 
successful court challenges.1
In 1908, the West Tennessee Land Company overcame the legal objections to private 
ownership of the lake, announced the company’s private control of the lake, and initiated legal 
action against locals who disregarded or disobeyed the company’s restrictions on public access 
to lake resources.  Locals organized into a band of night riders and, on April 12, 1908, destroyed 
John Carlos Burdick’s fish docks.  Between April and October of 1908, the night riders 
committed numerous crimes, but when the night riders murdered Quentin Rankin, Tennessee 
Governor Malcolm Patterson responded quickly.  Backed by the force of the state militia, 
Patterson quelled the uprising and began advocating for state ownership of Reelfoot Lake.  In 
1909, the state legislature approved the purchase of Reelfoot Lake in order to prevent future 
conflicts and preserve the lake for all Tennesseans, but landowners delayed state acquisition by 
   
                                                 
1 Paul Vanderwood, Night Riders of Reelfoot Lake (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1969), 7-
10. 
8 
 
mounting court challenges that contested the state’s right to condemn the property under the 
lake.  In 1914, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the state could acquire the property 
through condemnation and purchase; the state of Tennessee purchased all land below the 
“ordinary low-water mark” of Reelfoot Lake.2
The state acquired the lakebed, but court contests between the state and landholders 
persisted.  As the level of the lake rose and fell without regard to the state’s designated low-water 
mark, property owners challenged the state boundary through court cases and physical 
encroachment.  For years, the state struggled to contain the lake inside the boundary lines drawn 
by the state surveyor.  In 1917, the Tennessee Department of Highways and Public Works and 
the Tennessee Department of Game and Fish began three years of levee construction aimed at 
regulating the water level.  The state legislature instructed the state game warden, who 
administered state land at Reelfoot, to keep the water at a consistent level.  Levees, spillways, 
and the game warden failed to contain the lake.
 
3
Eleven years later, Tennessee governor Austin Peay attributed ongoing land disputes to 
the state’s “vague and uncertain boundary”  and argued that “there [was] no proper course except 
for the State to acquire a sufficient area surrounding this lake and end all agitation with its 
absolute ownership.”
   
4
                                                 
2 Vanderwood, 11-12, 144-147; Jim Johnson, Rivers Under Siege: The Troubled Saga of West Tennessee's 
Wetlands (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007), 90. 
  Peay tasked the Tennessee State Park and Forestry Commission with 
establishing precise boundaries at Reelfoot Lake and with managing and controlling all potential 
parklands within the state.  These political solutions proved almost as ineffective as earlier 
efforts to stabilize the waters.  Although both Patterson and Peay conceived of Reelfoot Lake as 
3 Johnson, 89-91.  
4 Tennessee, House Journal of the Sixty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, (Nashville: 
n.p.), 33. 
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a park, the legislature disbanded the Tennessee State Park and Forestry Commission in 1931 and 
delegated their powers to the Department of Game and Fish.5  During the New Deal, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) developed recreational 
lands across Tennessee.  Between 1934 and 1937, a CCC camp at Reelfoot Lake cleared trees, 
built picnic areas, and erected check-in stations for hunters and fishermen.6  In 1937, the state 
established the Tennessee Department of Conservation to oversee several new parks, but the lake 
remained under the administration of the Game and Fish Commission.  The lake did not 
officially enter Tennessee’s park system until 1956, when the Game and Fish Commission 
transferred 60 acres of land to the Department of Conservation.7
Paul Vanderwood, the only historian to offer a monograph on the night riding at Reelfoot 
Lake, credited the night riders for compelling the conservation of the lake because their efforts to 
“free Reelfoot Lake from the land company’s monopoly” forced the state’s acquisition and 
management of the lake.
 
8
                                                 
5James Don Milton, “A History of the Reelfoot Lake Biological Station” (MS thesis, University of 
Tennessee at Martin, 1969), 5, 
  Vanderwood assumed that the state of Tennessee acted as a neutral 
arbiter in the dispute; once Governor Malcolm Patterson decided to intervene, the mechanisms of 
state authority mediated on behalf of both the West Tennessee Land Company and the local 
residents.  Vanderwood saw the night riders as isolated from and bewildered by an increasingly 
modern world.  Their violent actions represented the desperate, reflexive response of simple, 
uneducated “people reacting to modernization, [as a result of] the movement from a rural to an 
http://scholarship.utm.edu/69/1/LD5300_M29K_0008.pdf (accessed October 1, 
2012). 
6 Carol van West, Tennessee's New Deal Landscape: A Guidebook (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 2001), 179. 
7 Bevley R. Coleman, “A History of State Parks in Tennessee” (PhD dissertation, George Peabody College 
for Teachers, 1963; reprint, [Nashville]: Tennessee Department of Conservation, Educational Service, 1967), 386. 
8 Vanderwood, 17. 
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urban mentality.”9
Vanderwood focused on the night riders’ demands for lake access and fishing rights, but 
the night riders’ spree of property destruction, beatings, and murders included many crimes 
unrelated to lake access or commercial fishing rights.  In October, before they attacked Quentin 
Rankin and Robert Z. Taylor, the night riders massacred an entire African American family.  
Between April and October, the night riders committed a number of other crimes that also 
targeted African Americans or whites who profited from African American farm labor, but 
Vanderwood dismissed race as a motivating factor in the uprising.  The night riders’ first and last 
attacks, the burning of J. C. Burdick’s fish docks in April and the murder of Quentin Rankin in 
October, targeted white men involved in restricting fishing access to Reelfoot Lake.  Attacks on 
African Americans were neither notable nor new, but newspaper editors and politicians noticed 
violence targeted at whites.  News reports of the violence at Reelfoot Lake emphasized the night 
riders’ unique demand for lake access; Malcolm Patterson’s advocacy for state ownership of the 
lake reinforced the perception of the night rider violence as a battle for lake access and fishing 
rights.   
  The night riders were unable to restore lake access directly, but after the state 
of Tennessee prosecuted their crimes, the government acted on their behalf and freed the lake 
from private control.  
The press and the state gave rhetorical primacy to fishing rights, and this perspective 
influenced Vanderwood’s analysis, which leaned heavily on news accounts of the uprising.  
Although his own meticulously reconstructed chronicle included crimes that suggest the night 
riders were concerned with racial and economic conditions beyond lake access, Vanderwood 
                                                 
9 Kathy Krone, “Author Says Night Riders’ Struggle for Social Justice Now Mirrored in Iraq,” State 
Gazette, November 18, 2003, http://www.stategazette.com/story/1057873.html (accessed February 22, 2012); 
Vanderwood, 20. 
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argued that the night riders were incapable of mounting an assault against complex social or 
political structures.  He wrote, “[The night riders] were neither administrators nor innovators.  
Few, if any, could even write a legible letter.”10
Vanderwood uncritically accepted early governmental conservation efforts as democratic 
and universally beneficial, an assumption which many historians shared during the 1950s and 
1960s.  Whitney Cross believed that both Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
land policies pursued the fundamentally democratic goal of preserving the character-building 
aspects of wilderness for all Americans.
  Decades of state action to solidify Tennessee’s 
claim to Reelfoot Lake and contemporary news reports of the violence suggested that the night 
riders sought nothing more than the restoration of fishing rights at Reelfoot Lake.  Vanderwood 
confirmed this narrative and created a scholarly foundation for the mythology of the night riders 
as simple people who went too far in an effort to save Reelfoot Lake.   
11  J. Leonard Bates and Freeman Tilden agreed that 
conservationists were altruistic progressives motivated by an overwhelming democratic impulse 
and intent on preserving nature from corporate exploitation.12
In 1959, Samuel P. Hays refuted the interpretative tradition that framed conservation as 
an idealistic, democratic return to nature and launched a historical re-examination of the 
conservation movement.  In Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, Hays argued that the 
conservation movement was primarily concerned with efficient production, rather than lofty 
intangible ideals.  For Hays, conservation was not an attempt to go back to nature but an effort to 
put technicians in control of nature.  Conservationists relied on technicians to achieve “rational 
   
                                                 
10 Vanderwood, 30. 
11 Whitney Cross, “Ideas in Politics: The Conservation Policies of the Two Roosevelts,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 14, no. 3 (June 1953): 421-438. 
12 J. Leonard Bates, “Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921,” The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44, no. 1 (June 1957): 29-57. 
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planning to promote efficient development and use of all natural resources.”13
 A subsequent analysis by Roderick Nash revealed that urban ideology and economic 
considerations, not democratic ideals, typically determined which lands were marked for national 
conservation.  Nash argued that the creation of national parks revealed tensions between urban 
conservationists and rural inhabitants of the land.  Nature tourists and the preservation movement 
from “the East and civilized islands in the West, like San Francisco”
  
14
In The Roots of Southern Populism, Steven Hahn incorporated agricultural, 
environmental, and social conditions into his analysis of upcountry Georgia between 1850 and 
1890.  Hahn argued that small, independent landowners regarded traditional access to land as an 
inherited right and recognized the importance of that right in maintaining their economic 
position.  Consequentially, farmers regarded that right as more legitimate than new legal 
restrictions based on the sovereignty of private property.  Hahn argued that the transition of 
southern plantation owners from labor lords to landlords resulted in the elevation of private 
property rights over traditional access and the spread of market production and the mechanisms 
of credit and debt, all of which pushed former smallholders toward tenancy.  For Hahn, southern 
Populism found widespread support among Georgia’s upcountry farmers because of these post-
 pushed for the 
conservation of remote ‘wilderness’ areas.  These supposedly wild areas, however, provided the 
homes and livelihoods of local residents, who often responded to urban conservation efforts with 
indifference or hostility.   
                                                 
13 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959; 
reprint Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1999), 1 (page citations are to the reprint edition), 2. 
14 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 
345. 
13 
 
Civil War economic changes.15
More recently, William Cronon and Karl Jacoby revealed that conservationist rhetoric 
and traditional interpretations of the conservation movement depended on the denigration of 
rural people.  Cronon argued that urban-industrial capitalism enabled people to imagine an 
ahistorical and unnatural nature that existed separate and apart from humans.  Rural people 
continued to depend on the productive capacities of rural landscapes for their livelihoods, but 
urbanites imagined an unpeopled landscape as a panacea against the failures of urban living and 
increasingly perceived the lives of rural people as polluting the imaginary wilderness they sought 
to create.
   
16  Karl Jacoby reconstructed the sparsely documented lives of the people who 
conservationists disdained by reading the primary sources created by conservationists.  
Interpreting these documents without the assumption that everyone except a few outliers 
benefited from governmental conservation efforts, Jacoby found that, when distant politicians 
passed conservation laws, rural residents who derived their living from the land transformed 
overnight from productive citizens to outlaws and poachers.17
The mythology of the Reelfoot Lake uprising relies on the assumptions that early 
conservation efforts were fundamentally fair, democratic, and universally beneficial, but 
environmental historians have consistently undermined these fundamental assumptions.  When 
considered within this interpretative tradition, the microhistory of Reelfoot Lake belies the myth 
contained within the prevailing historical narrative.  Farmers, fishermen, and landowners alike 
 
                                                 
15 Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia 
Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
16 William Cronon, ed., “The Trouble with Wilderness,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human 
Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90.  
17 Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, and Thieves and the Hidden History of 
American Conservation, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
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derived their livelihoods from the lake, the fields that the lake nourished, or the bluffs that 
contained the waters.  In the rural economy around Reelfoot Lake, the lake set environmental 
conditions that limited or expanded almost everyone’s productive capacity.  Consequentially, 
lake access played a dominant role in the conflict between the night riders and the land company, 
but a close analysis of the Reelfoot Lake uprising reveals that the night riders were responding to 
agricultural, social, and political pressures that extended far beyond fishing rights.  When 
contextualized within these broader themes, the Reelfoot Lake uprising also reveals the 
economic, racial, and political conditions that fueled political will toward an early act of 
unintentional conservation in Tennessee.  The lake exerted a heavy influence on the lives of 
people who lived on its shores, but it did not isolate people from the national trends of Populism 
and Progressivism that swept across the state during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.   
Although the first analysis of the Populist movement, John D. Hicks’ 1931 The Populist 
Revolt, emphasized the Midwest and ignored the South, subsequent historians have demonstrated 
that iterations of agrarian reform, Populism, and Progressivism exerted significant influence on 
the direction of the national reform impulse.18  C. Vann Woodward established the strength of 
the southern reform impulse in Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel.  For Woodward, the South played 
a central role in the Populists’ efforts to enact economically rational solutions to systemic 
problems, but appeals to white supremacy and conservative resistance undermined moderate 
support and contributed to Populism’s collapse.19
                                                 
18 John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, a History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1931). 
  In Origins of the New South, Woodward 
connected nineteenth-century agrarian reform to southern Progressivism: “It [southern 
19 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New York: Macmillan Co, 1938).  
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Progressivism] sprouted in the soil that had nourished Populism, but it lacked the agrarian cast 
and the radical edge that had frightened the middle class away from the earlier movement.”20  
Woodward established connections between southern Populism and Progressivism, but Arthur 
Link believed that many historians continued to subscribe to the “popular notion that such a 
thing as progressive democracy in the South was non-existent during the period 1870-1914.”21
Woodward saw dissatisfied agrarians and the Progressive reformers who they influenced 
as pursuing economically rational reforms, but Richard Hofstadter established an alternative 
interpretive tradition.  Hofstadter perceived both Populists and Progressives as struggling to 
regain societal status that had been lost when the acquisitive values of business replaced the 
traditional agrarian ideal.  Hofstadter proposed that a status revolution begun after the Civil War 
created a gap between farmers and the businessmen who profited economically and socially from 
the accompanying social changes.  In Populism, Hofstadter saw the contradictory impulses of a 
“soft” devotion to the agrarian myth, which led Populists to attempt to re-create a Utopian past, 
and a “hard” recognition of the need to adopt modern business practices.  Although unable to 
overcome these contradictory tendencies themselves, Populists influenced the next generation of 
reformers.  In the 1890s, the first generation raised in the new status economy came of age.  The 
prospect of drastic societal reorganization during a time of economic crisis threatened people 
  
Link called on other historians to step beyond the perception of the South as backward and mired 
in apolitical institutions to examine how iterations of southern Progressivism achieved political 
change within the boundaries imposed by racial prejudice and southern political institutions.  
                                                 
20C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South 1877-1913, ([Baton Rouge]: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1951), 371. 
21 Arthur Link, “Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914,” in Myth and Southern History, vol. 2, ed. 
Patrick Gerster and Nicholas Cords (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 60. 
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who had an investment in the existing system.  Consequently, the economic depression of the 
1890s frightened the new middle class into timidity, but they embraced the reform effort as 
economic conditions improved during the early twentieth century.  Hofstadter argued that, for 
Progressives, increased governmental power was a necessary counterbalance against the 
dangerous and potentially destabilizing concentrations of wealth and power.  Ultimately, 
Progressives succeeded “in fending off the battle of social extremes.”22
Gabriel Kolko argued that businessmen, not middle-class progressives, benefited most 
from Progressive Era reforms.  Through a close analysis of business conditions during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Kolko argued that, for the majority of businesses, 
mergers failed to produce monopoly control or increased profits.  With mergers failing to 
eliminate competition and reformers pressuring state politicians to enact sweeping reforms aimed 
at dismantling the existing structure of wealth and power, businessmen turned to federal 
regulation as a way to sate the popular demand for oversight while implementing reforms that 
buttressed the status quo.  In Kolko’s analysis, middle-class reformers did not compel the 
government to restrict corporations.  Instead, businessmen harnessed the rhetoric of reform and 
colluded with government officials to enact regulations that solidified their own wealth and 
power.
   
23
Scholars analyzing the Progressive Era uncovered a shifting and often contradictory 
range of reformers, rhetoric, and programs that made it increasingly difficult to define a unified, 
national Progressive movement.  Facing this fractured, issue-focused mass of reform movements, 
Peter Filene questioned the value of the term “Progressivism” itself, arguing that without unified 
   
                                                 
22 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Knopf, 1955), 243.  
23 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism; A Re-Interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 
([New York]: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 302. 
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members or goals the term was meaningless.24  Jack Temple Kirby recognized that southern 
Progressivism was more of a pervasive sentiment than a unified movement but argued that 
southern Progressives saw racial and electoral controls as prerequisites for all other social 
improvement programs.  The threat of radical racial alliances disappeared as voters united behind 
a program of black disfranchisement that joined rural anti-trust sentiments with the urban drive 
for organization.  As a result, “most ‘progressive’ reform came about ultimately at the sufferance 
of shrewd men interested mainly in their own continued control.”25
Although historical analyses of Populism and Progressivism usually emphasized either 
the nineteenth or twentieth century reform movements, most historians recognized Populist 
influences on the later Progressive movement.  Lawrence Goodwyn drew a firm line at the 1896 
nomination of William Jennings Bryan.  For Goodwyn, Populism derived its strength from a 
movement culture developed during earlier agrarian reform efforts.  In Democratic Promise, the 
first national study of Populism since Hicks’ The Populist Revolt, Goodwyn positioned Populism 
as a rational, admirable attempt to imagine a democratic society built on cooperative values.  
Goodwyn argued that racism lay outside the movement culture, which he perceived as the core 
of Populism.  For Goodwyn, twentieth century reforms sought only to tweak systems that the 
movement culture of Populism had promised to remake.
  Anti-trust sentiment 
pervaded the South, but with the focus of southern reform directed at the separation of the races, 
conservative southern reforms reinforced the existing social order.   
26
                                                 
24Peter G. Filene, “An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement,’” American Quarterly 22, no. 1 (Spring, 
1970): 20-34. 
   
25Jack Temple Kirby, Darkness at the Dawning: Race and Reform in the Progressive South (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1972), 43. 
26Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). 
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For Charles Postel, Goodwyn’s analysis represented a compelling historical tragedy that 
“fits within the larger narrative of the defeat of traditional society by modernity,” but revealed 
little about Populists’ lives, motivations, or aspirations.27  Postel argued that Populists envisioned 
a future in which science, technology, economies of scale, and progress worked in favor of the 
producer class.  Postel also rejected Hofstadter’s argument that Populist devotion to a “soft” 
agrarian ideal limited the movement’s ability to formulate effective business solutions.  Postel’s 
analysis revealed that Populists were deeply modern and highly committed to influencing 
business practices in ways that served their self-interest.  Almost every aspect of the Populist 
movement hinged on faith in science and modernity.  Agrarian reformers, nonconformists, and 
dissatisfied producers found Populism’s message appealing.  The Farmers’ Alliance offered 
business-focused educational programs, encouraged farmers to defy stereotypes that cast rural 
people as ignorant, and welcomed women into leadership positions.  Populist reformers targeted 
railroads, banks, and the monetary system because they viewed these systems “as antiquated, 
premodern obstacles to progress.”28  Postel recognized that Populist support for Chinese 
exclusion in California and the hardening of segregation in the South revealed a faith in modern 
improvements, not a devotion to tradition.  Southern Populists were not stuck in the quagmire of 
deeply entrenched, traditional racism.  Along with other white southerners, they saw “white 
supremacy and racial separatism as cornerstones of modern, scientific, and progressive race 
relations.”29
                                                 
27 Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 270. 
  Unlike Goodwyn, Postel saw continuities between Populism and Progressivism, but 
he argued that Progressive reformers reduced the broad and widely democratic reforms proposed 
by Populists to narrow changes implemented by a small group of experts.   
28 Postel, 150. 
29 Postel, 202. 
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Historians looking at political trends have addressed the role race played within the 
Populist and Progressive movements, but other scholars have directly examined the dramatic 
escalation of racial violence that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century.  Richard 
Maxwell Brown and Ted Robert Gurr saw violence as a persistent theme in American history.  
Brown saw violence as a basic tool of class and ethnic conflicts.  He argued that frontier 
lynching often served as a stabilizing force in a community where effective mechanisms of law 
and order did not exist, but that whites used extralegal violence like lynching as a mechanism for 
social control following the end of slavery.  Gurr drew categorical distinctions between different 
forms of violence.  In his analysis, “the perception that other groups or circumstances prevent 
people from realizing their value expectations [was] a necessary condition for political protest 
and rebellion.”30  For Gurr, violence represented a risky, but rational, political action which 
groups deployed to achieve either conservative or reformist goals.  The most common form of 
terrorism in the United States, vigilante terrorism as exemplified by lynching and the Ku Klux 
Klan, used intimidation and violence to achieve conservative social goals, elicited widespread 
popular support, and often achieved significant success.31
In Lynching in the New South, W. Fitzhugh Brundage uncovered changes to the patterns 
of lynching over time by examining lynching in Georgia and Virginia between 1880 and 1930.  
To track these changes, Brundage divided lynch mobs into three groups: terrorist, mass, and 
private.  Unlike mass mobs, which dispersed after a lynching, and private mobs, which were 
typically the friends and family of the reported victim, terrorist mobs did not form spontaneously 
   
                                                 
30 Ted Robert Gurr, “The History of Protest, Rebellion, and Reform in America: An Overview,” in Violence 
in America, vol. 2, ed. Ted Robert Gurr (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 14. 
31 Ted Robert Gurr, “Political Terrorism: Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Trends,” in Violence in 
America, vol. 2, ed. Ted Robert Gurr (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 204-206.  
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in response to a specific incident and they often maintained organization over long periods.  
Mobs lynched most victims following accusations of murder, rape, or serious physical attacks, 
but occasionally mobs lynched victims for minor offenses.  Terrorist mobs committed fewer than 
twelve percent of the lynchings that Brundage analyzed, but between 1890 and 1910, they 
committed the majority of lynchings for minor offenses.  Brundage argued that terrorist mobs 
used violence as a weapon for social control, moral regulation, or as a means to “shore up their 
increasingly vulnerable economic status.”32  Most lynching victims were black, but the few 
white victims in Brundage’s analysis revealed that “even in the act of lynching, whites drew a 
line separating the races.”33
Although the bulk of historical literature focuses on national or regional trends, historians 
have also provided secondary literature that describes the unique conditions within Tennessee 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Historians writing in both the Hofstadter 
and Woodward traditions have examined the Populist revolt in Tennessee.  Writing in the 
Hofstadter tradition, Richard Hart examined Tennessee politics between 1870 and 1896.  Hart 
determined that wealthier farmers occupied leadership positions within the Alliance, and that 
  In both Georgia and Virginia, mobs lynched white victims 
occasionally during the 1880s and 1890s, but with each passing decade, whites increasingly 
reserved lynching as a punishment for African Americans.  Unlike violence against African 
Americans, violence against white victims carried a high likelihood of reprisal.  All the white 
victims whom Brundage analyzed stood accused of particularly heinous crimes.  The mobs 
involved were smaller and calmer than the mobs that attacked black victims and the mobs killed 
white victims swiftly. 
                                                 
32W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993), 24. 
33 Brundage, 92. 
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after they won political offices in 1891, these Alliancemen voted with the Democrats.  
Ultimately, Hart argued that the nineteenth century farmers’ movements offered little more than 
rhetoric, which restored the diminished social status of wealthier farmers and propelled them into 
office.  He argued that Tennessee’s agrarian reformers were consistently weak and never posed a 
significant threat to the existing political structure.  Consequentially, Hart ended his analysis 
with the defeat of the national People’s Party in 1896. 
Hart’s examination of Populism in Tennessee relied on a strict political analysis, an 
approach that Connie Lester argued artificially isolated political reform efforts from the broader 
pattern of agrarian unrest.  In her book, Up From the Mudsills of Hell, Lester united political, 
agricultural, and environmental approaches to argue that the unified political action of the 
Populists was only one of the many forms that agrarian reform took during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  In Tennessee, agrarian political action arose from farmers’ desire 
to effect substantial change on their material conditions, not as a way to achieve political power 
itself.  Despite the impression conveyed by pure political analyses, “the agrarian movement did 
not begin with the Farmers’ Alliance in 1886 and end with the defeat of William Jennings Bryan 
in 1896.”34  Lester extended her analysis from 1870 to 1915 to examine the various approaches 
adopted by farmers who “recognized the changing economy of the period and demanded the 
tools to participate in that change as independent producers, not hired hands.”35
                                                 
34Connie L. Lester, The Farmers' Alliance, Populism, and Progressive Agriculture in Tennessee, 1870-
1915 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 4. 
  By extending 
her vision beyond the narrow focus of politics, Lester revealed that Tennessee’s agrarian 
reformers posed consistent threats to entrenched hierarchies of power.  For Lester, when the 
broadly based Populist Party collapsed, the agrarian movement splintered but did not disappear.   
35 Lester, 249. 
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Lester identified two divergent branches of agrarian reform that emerged after the 
collapse of Populism.  Some agrarian reformers joined the Farmers’ Union, which aimed to 
provide tangible benefits to members through a business-oriented approach to farming.  Many of 
these reformers entered the developing agricultural bureaucracy and “added their voices to the 
Progressive reshaping of American life.”36  Other farmers responded by creating narrow, local 
groups that focused on a specific location or commodity.  Lester argued that, in both the Black 
Patch region of Tennessee and Kentucky and around Reelfoot Lake, these sorts of organizations 
blended “older forms of community vigilantism and newer judicial and bureaucratic pressures” 
to achieve their goals.37
Although the night riders at Reelfoot Lake shared many characteristics with the Black 
Patch night riders, the organizations were distinct.  Christopher Waldrep demonstrated that the 
Black Patch night riders formed with the sanction and guidance of the elite leadership who 
controlled the Planter’s Protective Association (PPA).  In 1907, the elite planters lost control of 
the night riders.  While guided by the planters, the Black Patch night riders had enacted violence 
that Waldrep characterized as traditional.  They initiated restrained attacks against specific 
people who were obstructing their goals in an effort to terrorize or coerce the offender into line.  
After the night riders shook free of the planters’ guidance, they initiated violence that Waldrep 
characterized as modern.  In these attacks, the night riders launched vicious, deadly attacks 
against African Americans in an effort to terrorize all African Americans.
   
38
                                                 
36 Lester, 249. 
  As Brundage 
revealed, the lynching of white men was very rare after 1900 and always carried a heavy risk of 
37 Lester, 247. 
38Christopher Waldrep, Night Riders: Defending Community in the Black Patch, 1890-1915 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993). 
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reprisal, even when the victim was relatively unknown and accused of a heinous crime.  When 
the Black Patch night riders selected their own victims, they minimized the likelihood of 
reprisals by targeting African Americans.  No official authorities or powerful elites sanctioned 
the actions of the night riders at Reelfoot Lake or protected the members of the band, but the 
violence that they enacted was much more dangerous than the violence that the Black Patch 
night riders committed while operating on their own authority.  In 1908, the night riders of 
Reelfoot Lake lynched a white lawyer of prominence and influence and riddled his body with 
bullets.  Taken within the existing narrative, and considering the high risk of reprisal associated 
with this type of crime, their actions seem inexplicable. 
In a brief review of the Cross Timbers fence cutting war that erupted in Texas during the 
1880s, Charles Postel revealed how dramatically interpretations of events can change when 
historians consider distinct, local conditions.  Postel offered his summary of historian Robert 
McMath’s portrayal of the Cross Timbers conflict, which McMath compared to the English 
enclosure movement: “The precapitalist farmers of Cross Timbers, as with their English peasant 
counterparts, fought to defend a traditional culture based on mutuality, limited property rights in 
land, and self-sufficiency.”39
                                                 
39 Postel, 27. 
  Next, Postel revealed that, during the conflict, farmers in Cross 
Timbers were working to increase settlement, raise real estate values, and strengthen market 
connections in an effort to incite a land boom and improve their environment.  Conflicts flared 
between ranchers and farmers when settlement encroached on land claimed by corporate land 
syndicates, which farmers perceived as obstacles to progressive agricultural development.  Postel 
concluded, “Such was the context of the fence wars across the farmers’ frontier, where two 
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patterns of private property rights overlapped, one favoring the rancher, the other the farmer.”40
Recently, David Correia proposed a similar reinterpretation of Los Gorras Blancas (the 
white caps) of New Mexico.  Correia contextualized Los Gorras Blancas’ fence cutting campaign 
using the framework of political ecology, which examines environmental issues through conflict.  
Scholars developed political ecology as a method for accounting for the roles that local history, 
political power relationships, and social conditions exert in resource conflicts.  In political 
ecology, the environment acts as “an arena of contested entitlements, a theater in which conflicts 
or claims over property, assets, labor and the politics of recognition play themselves out.”
   
41
The prevailing historical narrative of Los Gorras Blancas portrayed the violence as an 
effort to preserve traditional rights.  In 1889, Los Gorras Blancas initiated a violent fence cutting 
campaign against Anglo settlers and commercial interests who enclosed land within the Town of 
Las Vegas Land Grant, which Mexico issued to settlers during the 1830s.  Under the terms of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War, the United States was 
obligated to respect Mexican land grants, but the residents of Las Vegas and the United States 
government interpreted the terms of that agreement differently.
   
42
Correia revealed that the arrival of the railroad in Las Vegas accelerated economic 
changes, including the expansion of timber and grazing operations, which had been occurring for 
years.  These dramatic changes remade the economy, transforming Hispano smallholders into 
wage laborers.  Although the actions and rhetoric of Los Gorras Blancas expressed an “explicit 
challenge to the… newly emerging economic order,” newspapers and territorial officials, both of 
   
                                                 
40 Postel, 28. 
41 Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts, “Violent Environments,” in Violent Environments, ed. Nancy Lee 
Peluso and Michael Watts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 25.  
42Robert W. Larson "The White Caps of New Mexico: A Study of Ethnic Militancy in the Southwest," 
Pacific Historical Review 44, no. 2 (May 1975): 171-185. 
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whom shared an interest in the emerging economic order, portrayed Los Gorras Blancas’ as 
ignorant and dismissed their larger goals.  Los Gorras Blancas were overtly political.  Leaders in 
the organization created chapters of the Knights of Labor throughout San Miguel County and 
secured the support of the local Populist Party; voters elected a known leader of the group to 
territorial government during the fence cutting campaign.  Despite their political successes, 
interpretations of Los Gorras Blancas emphasized their interest in preserving tradition instead of 
their critique of “the social upheaval that followed the arrival of barbed wire fencing, railroad 
development, and large-scale commercial ranching.”43
Historians have revealed the erroneous assumptions that permeated uncritical histories of 
the conservation movement, uncovered the central role that race played in the southern iterations 
of both Populism and Progressivism, revealed the fundamentally conservative nature of 
Progressive Era reforms, and questioned the motives that led reformers to denigrate local people.  
 
The uprising at Reelfoot Lake represents a narrow slice of time, but the events surrounding the 
night riders’ campaign touch on each of these themes.  Although they chose tactics similar to 
other terrorist organizations of the time, the night riders at Reelfoot Lake responded to intensely 
local conditions.  Charles Postel’s analysis of the Cross Timbers fence cutting war and David 
Correia’s examination of Los Gorras Blancas suggest that even in their intense focus on local 
conditions, the night riders at Reelfoot Lake were not unique.   
The violence that erupted around Reelfoot Lake in 1908 was neither an inexplicable 
anomaly nor the reflexive backlash of traditionalists against modernization.  Instead, the lake 
became the arena where farmers contested the cotton economy, which excluded them from 
                                                 
43David Correia, "Retribution Will Be Their Reward: New Mexico's Las Gorras Blancas and the Fight for 
the Las Vegas Land Grant Commons" Radical History Review no. 108 (Fall 2010): 67. 
26 
 
participation, and the agricultural, social, and political changes that accompanied the new 
economic system.  The night rider’s broad critique of the cotton economy threatened a system 
that served landlords, local elites, and politicians, but locals seeking fishing access posed little 
threat of dismantling the existing power of wealth and authority.  State acquisition legitimized 
the portrayal of the uprising as an effort to save the lake rather than a critique of the cotton 
economy.  In this context, state acquisition of Reelfoot Lake protected and perpetuated the cotton 
economy by diverting attention away from the night riders’ actual critique. 
  Connie Lester wrote that “the Reelfoot Lake uprising invites us to re-evaluate our 
assumptions about the resistance to modernity that infuses rural historiography.”44
                                                 
44 Connie Lester, “Lester’s Response to Walker on Lester,_Up From the Mudsills of Hell_,” message to H-
Net List Editor Derek W. Frisby, March 21, 2007,  
  The chapters 
that follow respond to that invitation by providing a microhistory of the Reelfoot Lake uprising 
aimed at uncovering the conditions that informed the night rider violence and state’s response.  
The first chapter establishes the agricultural and economic changes that the area around Reelfoot 
Lake experienced between 1870 and 1910, when cotton cultivation, and the African American 
laborers who increasingly farmed that cotton for large landlords, moved into the region.  The 
second chapter situates the actual outbreak of violence in 1908 alongside agricultural conditions 
and details the night rider attacks.  The final chapter explores the political conditions that 
informed Governor Malcolm Patterson’s intervention at Reelfoot Lake.  Although the majority 
of his political support arose from his urban Progressive base, during his campaigns Patterson 
positioned himself as the inheritor of the agrarian reform impulse.  Patterson risked alienating 
carefully cultivated rural voters by intervening in the night riders’ attacks on African Americans 
and the expanding cotton economy, but neither Patterson nor his urban voter base would allow 
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=lm&list=H-tennessee (accessed February 3, 2012). 
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poor whites to vent their frustrations on prominent white men.   
Patterson’s urban Progressive base operated from assumptions that necessarily denigrated 
rural life as backward and ignorant.  These assumptions, not the actual conditions around 
Reelfoot Lake, established a narrative that portrayed the murder of Captain Rankin as an 
exceptionally violent response by locals attempting to protect traditional fishing rights.  Just four 
days after Rankin’s death, northern Episcopal minister Charles F. Scofield explained “the 
viewpoint of the poor outlaws” to readers of The New York Times.  “The poor natives have 
enjoyed the privilege of hunting and fishing on the lake without hindrance … [and] had come to 
regard the privilege as a right,” Scofield wrote.  These privileges fell outside the law, but 
Scofield asked readers, “Yet could you expect the crude, illiterate fishermen to see the matter in 
the legal light?”  Despite the natives’ lawless actions, the reverend exhorted readers that the 
“primitive people” at Reelfoot Lake were “not outlaws in the ordinary sense of the word.  They 
are native-born Americans of pure Anglo-Saxon blood and act as their ancestors would.”  
Scofield admonished readers to respond to the violence committed by their living ancestors not 
with condemnation but with missionaries and teachers to hone their “keen native sense of 
justice” and rectify their “condition of ignorance.”45
Scofield saw all rural productive activities as primitive, but he particularly emphasized 
fishing as evidence that lake residents were mired in an ancestral state.  In positioning lake 
residents as the living ancestors of his urban audience, he dismissed rural life as a relic of a 
bygone era while preserving the possibility of rural uplift; teachers and ministers who shared the 
positive qualities that Scofield attributed to a pure Anglo-Saxon bloodline could harness those 
   
                                                 
45 Scofield, Charles F., “Reelfoot Lake: A Plea For the Inhabitants of That Region,” The New York Times, 
October 23, 1908. 
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traits and lead rural people into the modern era through education and outreach programs.  In 
later years, Scofield performed this type of rural missionary work himself, conducting 
sociological surveys of the rural northeast in an effort to modernize and increase the efficiency of 
country congregations.46
                                                 
46 The American Church Almanac and Yearbook for 1917, vol. 87 (New York: Edwin S. Gorham, 1916), 
308; Interchurch World Movement of North America, Speakers’ Manual, abridged ed. (New York: Interchurch 
Movement of America, 1920), 123; Interchurch World Movement of North America, World Survey (New York: 
Interchurch Press, 1920), 170.  
  Without the intervention of educated outsiders, the living ancestors of 
Scofield’s depiction were incapable of understanding, much less attacking, the complex 
mechanisms of the modern economy.  Mythological depictions of the night riders at Reelfoot 
Lake such as Scofield’s account resonated with the expectations of urban Progressives and 
eventually informed the prevailing historical analysis of the uprising, but this narrative 
contradicted the modern economic realities that confronted the residents of Reelfoot Lake and 
obscured their participation in the new cotton economy.   
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CHAPTER 2 
GROUNDING DISCONTENT 
Reelfoot Lake lies in the northwestern corner of Tennessee, with a small portion 
extending into Fulton County, in southern Kentucky.  In Tennessee, Lake and Obion Counties lie 
on opposite sides of Reelfoot Lake, meeting along the southern shore (Figure 1).  Residents in 
both counties derived their livelihoods from the land, but they were hardly simple, self-sufficient 
precapitalists.  As early as the 1870s, both counties produced goods for markets, adjusted 
production in light of market conditions, and maintained ties to distant urban markets by 
shipping goods via railroads or the Mississippi River.  Farmers on both sides of the lake adopted 
cotton when it first arrived in the region but quickly learned that environmental conditions in 
Lake County were uniquely suited to cotton production.  As a result, large landowners in Lake 
Figure 1. Map of Reelfoot Lake and the surrounding area. 
Source: Rand McNally and Company, “Standard Map of Tennessee,” in The Commercial Atlas of America, 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1924), 246. 
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County profited from the new cotton economy while Obion County’s small farmers struggled 
against falling prices and rising debt.  Accustomed to exerting significant influence over state 
politics, hard-pressed farmers joined agrarian reform movements and elected agrarian 
representatives.  Despite their vigorous participation in markets, reform trends, and politics, at 
the turn of the twentieth century, Obion County farmers found themselves increasingly blocked 
from participation in the new economy.  For farmers on Reelfoot Lake’s eastern shore, the lake 
functioned as a physical barrier against the further expansion of the cotton economy.  Obion 
farmers recognized Reelfoot Lake as a crucial resource, not because of their deep devotion to 
traditional fishing rights, but because the cotton economy had already eroded their economic, 
social, and political protections.  By 1908, only the physical barrier remained.   
During the earthquakes of 1811 and 1812, water from the Mississippi drainage flowed 
backwards into a shallow depression, creating Reelfoot Lake.  Before Mississippi River 
backflow covered the land, both North Carolina and Tennessee had apportioned out the area 
under Reelfoot Lake in a series of overlapping land grants.  Tucked into the far corner of the 
state, Reelfoot Lake lies as far from Tennessee’s urban centers as one can get without leaving the 
state.  Cypress trees thrive in Reelfoot Lake, rising in thick stands in seemingly open water and 
crowding the shore.  Small boats can maneuver sections of Reelfoot, but large boats cannot 
manage the plants, logs, and trees that lie in thick snarls just under the surface.   
Tiny Lake County occupies less than 200 square miles between the western shore of 
Reelfoot Lake and the Mississippi River.  Originally part of Obion County, Lake County was 
created because high water marooned residents on the western shore between the lake and the 
river, making it difficult for them to reach the county seat in eastern Obion County.  In 1870, the 
Tennessee state legislature recognized the problem and carved Lake County out of Obion 
 31 
 
County.  Given Lake County’s geographic isolation, even J. B. Killebrew, Tennessee’s first 
Commissioner of Agriculture, believed that Lake County offered “fewer advantages” to its 
residents than other counties and that the farmers there were “not as progressive nor as well 
educated” as elsewhere.1  Nonetheless, the waters that prevented travel also nourished the fields.  
All of Lake County boasted a thick covering of flat, rich bottomland, in some areas amounting to 
deposits of black alluvial soil reaching ten feet in depth.  Soil types varied throughout the county 
and flooding posed a problem in many areas, but corn grew well in even the poorest Lake 
County soil.2
East of Reelfoot Lake, Obion County’s high bluffs rise along the shore.  Obion County 
land varies more than Lake County’s uniform bottomland.  On the eastern side of the county, 
near Union City, large farmers took advantage of flat expanses.  Along the shores of Reelfoot 
Lake, sharp bluffs, rolling hills, and dense woodlands made clearing land for farming more 
difficult than in eastern Obion County or in pancake-flat Lake County.  In 1874, J. B. Killebrew 
reported that the lands nearest the lake were not preferred for farming because it was “difficult to 
get enough level or arable land in a body to make a respectable farm.”
   
3
                                                 
1 J. B. Killebrew, First and Second Reports of the Bureau of Agriculture for the State of Tennessee. 
Introduction to the Resources of Tennessee (Nashville: Tavel, Eastman and Howell, 1874), 1123. 
  Once cleared, however, 
the soil was productive.  Farmers who were willing to cultivate crops suited to various soil types 
could piece together productive farms.  The steep hillsides provided excellent soil for cultivating 
fruit or vines, while the lake bottoms between Reelfoot Lake and the bluffs offered rich cropland.  
2 J. B. Killebrew, First and Second Reports, “Lake County” and “Obion County;” Eugene W. Hilgard, 
Report on Cotton Production in the United States: Also Embracing Agricultural and Physico-Geographical 
Description of the Several Cotton States and of California, (Washington: GPO, 1884), 48. 
3 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 1150. 
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Corn flourished in the areas subject to overflow from the lake, and strips of land above the high 
water mark provided fertile ground for crops sensitive to flooding.4
Although the majority of men who became night riders were farmers, tenants, or farm 
laborers rather than fishermen, some residents around Reelfoot Lake earned their living directly 
from the lake or used fishing to supplement their agricultural earnings.
   
5  A committee 
investigating conditions at Reelfoot after the uprising reported that five hundred families relied 
on fishing, but only 72 men were identified as fishermen or hunters in the 1900 census, and 69 in 
the 1910 census.  While incomplete, this sample suggests that fishing offered an entry point into 
the lake economy.  Few fishermen owned land and a large number, 46 percent in 1900 and 28 
percent in 1910, were not native to Tennessee.  Very few owned property.  In 1900, 64 out of 72 
fishermen were boarders, renters, secondary earners, or dependents in other households.  Of the 
other eight, six owned a home, one owned a farm, and one rented a farm.  The situation was not 
much different in 1910, when 63 out of 69 fishermen were dependents or secondary earners.  
Only eleven men, all married, appeared as fishermen in both the 1900 and 1910 census.6
As a group, the fishermen were educated.  In 1900, only seven fishermen, less than 10 
percent, were illiterate.  Even the fishermen who could not read themselves were not resistant to 
education.  A. H. Johnson, himself illiterate, had three children, all of whom could read and 
write.  All of the Johnson children attended eight months of school during 1900, including 16-
   
                                                 
4 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, “Lake County” and “Obion County.” 
5 Paul J. Vanderwood, Night Riders of Reelfoot Lake, (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1969), 
27. 
6 Vanderwood, 18; Ancestry.com, 1900 and 1910 United States Federal Census: Population: Tennessee: 
Obion and Lake Counties ([database on-line]: Provo, UT: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2004), 
http://www.ancestry.com (accessed January 1, 2012). 
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year-old Luther and 13-year-old Arch, either of whom was old enough to leave school in order to 
supplement household income through fishing or farm labor.7
Overall, the fishermen at Reelfoot Lake were mobile white men on the lower rung of the 
economic ladder.  For the substantial minority of fishermen who were born outside of Tennessee, 
lake fishing provided a livelihood, but it could not have represented a revered family tradition.  
Few men who had access to farmland identified as fishermen.  Small farmers and farm laborers 
may have relied on fishing income to supplement farm earnings but, farming, not fishing, drove 
the economy.  Around Reelfoot, if men could farm, they did.   
   
After the Civil War, farmers in both Lake and Obion Counties shifted agricultural 
production in reaction to market forces.  In 1871 and 1872, cotton cultivation spread north into 
both counties.  “Prior to the war no cotton was raised in the county,” wrote a Lake County farmer 
in 1872, but “since the war… the price of corn has got so low that we have been compelled to 
quit it and go to raising cotton, which is paying us finely.”8  In both counties, a scarcity of 
agricultural labor dating back to the Civil War ensured high wages for good hands and white 
farm laborers dominated the market.  In fact, Lake County boasted a lower “proportion of 
colored to white than any other of the richer counties” in the state, with only 393 African 
Americans in a population of 2,428. 9  Throughout the decade, farm hands in both counties 
commanded wages between $18 and $25 a month, plus board. 10
                                                 
7 Ancestry.com, 1900 United States Federal Census: Population: Tennessee: Obion County: Civil District 
3: District 97, 3, 
  As a result, agricultural 
employers in both counties sought anxiously for ways to recruit new laborers.  In Lake County, 
http://www.ancestry.com (accessed January 22, 2012). 
8 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 1121.  
9 Joseph B. Killebrew, West Tennessee: Its Resources and Advantages. Cheap Homes for Immigrants, 
(Nashville, TN: Tavel, Eastman and Howell, 1879), 43, http://www.hathitrust.org/, s.v. “West Tennesse: Its 
Resources” (accessed January 20, 2012). 
10 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 1122; J. B. Killebrew, West Tennessee, 43. 
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farmers and farm laborers quickly learned that cotton paid; by 1873, cotton covered one-fourth 
of Lake County’s improved lands.11
For farmers, the challenge to planting some crops in Lake County’s dark soil proved to be 
getting them to stop growing rather than getting them to grow.  Perched on an island of 
Mississippi fertilizer, farmers voiced the unusual agricultural complaint that the land was too 
productive.  A Lake County farmer explained, “The land is too fertile for oats, causing them to 
grow so high that they fall down before ripening and are destroyed.”
   
12  Cotton posed a similar 
problem.  On newly cleared fields where previous plantings had not depleted the soil, cotton 
often performed poorly.  Farmer R. M. Darnall complained, “On fresh land, unless the season is 
dry, the plant goes to weed.”13  Even on previously cultivated land, cotton threatened to run to 
weed before harvest whenever there was ample rainfall.  To get ripe bolls, farmers learned to 
plow shallow furrows and to turn the ground less often.14
Even when wheat shared a planting cycle with cotton, as was often the case in Lake 
County, the growing season for these crops provided farmers a slack period between planting 
and harvest.  A farmer or farm hand could plant far more cotton than he could harvest in fall.  
Everywhere cotton was planted, the success of the crop depended on a large pool of workers 
performing backbreaking labor for a few weeks, but for much of the year cotton required little 
attention.  Lake County’s fertile soil exaggerated this seasonal imbalance.  In Lake County, 
farmers did less work during planting than cotton farmers in other areas, turning shallow crop 
beds in the loose earth, applying no fertilizer, and minimizing plowing. 
   
                                                 
11 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 967. 
12 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 1121. 
13 Hilgard, 49. 
14 Hilgard, 49, 98. 
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During the 1870s, Lake and Obion Counties entered the cotton economy, but farmers in 
both counties maintained diversified market production.  Taking advantage of the natural 
resources around Reelfoot Lake, Lake County shipped fish and timber to markets in Nashville, 
St. Louis, Mobile, and New Orleans.  Obion County farmers shared in the fish and timber 
markets but also cultivated a fine variety of silky and mild tobacco and ranked second in the state 
for the production of orchard products. 15
Farmers in Lake County depended on the Mississippi River for shipping goods to market, 
but Obion County boasted two railroads, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and the Nashville and 
Northwestern Railroad, which joined at Union City.  From Union City, the Nashville and 
Northwestern continued to Hickman, Kentucky, just north of Reelfoot Lake.
 
16  For many 
residents near the lake, Hickman offered a more accessible market and rail line than the cities in 
eastern Obion County.  By 1880, The Hickman Courier bragged, “Cotton seed this year is 
attracting very considerable trade to this place, for [Hickman] is the only point this side of 
Nashville or Memphis which offers a real market.”17
During the 1880s, farmers in both Obion and Lake Counties increased the number of 
acres planted in cotton, with acreage rising by 12 percent in Obion and 19 percent in Lake.  
Farmers in Lake County never grew tobacco in any significant amount, but farmers in Obion 
County did.  As Obion’s farmers increased cotton acreage, they reduced tobacco acreage by 10 
percent.  In Lake County, the increase in cotton acreage paid off, producing a 60 percent increase 
  As the cotton economy flourished in Lake 
County, Hickman grew and the labor shortage shrank. 
                                                 
15 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 98-102, 967, 1119-1123; 1154. 
16 Killebrew, First and Second Reports, 1159. 
17 Untitled, The Hickman Courier, December 17, 1880, 4.  
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over 1880 levels by 1890.  Meanwhile, Obion County farmers experienced an 83 percent drop in 
cotton production between 1880 and 1890 despite their tentative expansion of cotton acreage. 
After 1880, Lake County permanently surpassed much larger Obion County in cotton 
production.  During the 1890s, Obion County farmers followed a statewide trend, turning away 
from cotton and toward tobacco.  Farmers in Obion County responded to their losing gamble on 
cotton cultivation by reducing cotton acreage by 79 percent and increasing tobacco acreage by 84 
percent.  Obion farmers continued to grow cotton, but they planted the crop in significantly 
smaller amounts than they had before 1890.  Cotton acreage finally surpassed 1880s levels in 
1910, but even then, Obion’s farmers hedged their bets against the hope of rising cotton prices by 
also increasing tobacco acreage during the period.18  Obion farmers remained tied to cotton, but 
they reduced their reliance on the crop.19
Tobacco offered Obion farmers an escape from the cotton market, but unlike cotton, 
tobacco was year-round work.  At least two months before spring planting, farmers sprouted 
seeds in small, carefully prepared and protected seedbeds.  Tobacco plants demanded individual 
attention from the time the seeds sprouted until the mature plants were cut.  Individual plants 
were topped to prevent flowering and channel the plant’s resources into leaf production.  After 
topping, plants produced suckers (secondary roots), which farmers removed to promote 
necessary leaf growth.  Repeated weeding and the hand removal of worms protected the all-
important leaves of each plant.  When farmers finally cut the mature tobacco, they began the 
 
                                                 
18 U.S. Bureau of Census. Census of Agriculture 1870-1910. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/Historical_Publications/index.asp (accessed January 22, 1912). 
19 U.S. Bureau of Census. Censuses of Agriculture, 1870-1910. Washington D.C: Government Printing 
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curing process, which stretched well into the next planting cycle.  In moving from cotton to 
tobacco, growers committed to overlapping seasons of constant work.20
As Obion County farmers attempted to navigate the shifting agricultural conditions of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by reducing cotton acreage and increasing tobacco 
production, Lake County’s large landholders embraced cotton.  By 1889, Lake County had the 
second highest cotton yield per acre of any county in the state and the second highest 
concentration of cotton production.
   
21  Between 1890 and 1900, the turn to cotton in Lake County 
was startling, with cotton acreage ballooning by 374 percent in just ten years.  During the early 
years of the twentieth century, landlords covered even more acreage in cotton.  In the twenty 
years between 1890 and 1910, Lake County went from planting 3,850 acres of cotton to 30,234 
acres.22  For Lake County’s landlords, the expansion was profitable.  Between 1900 and 1910, 
the crop value per farm in Lake County was high enough to skew the state average.23
The growth of the cotton economy brought a number of related changes to the area 
around Reelfoot Lake, including a rapid demographic shift in the racial mix of the counties.  In 
1870, before Lake County entered the cotton economy, the racial demographics of Lake and 
Obion Counties were approximately equal, with African Americans comprising 16 percent of the 
population in Lake County and 14 percent in Obion.  Although the population in Obion County 
grew throughout the period, the percentage of African Americans as a proportion of the total 
population experienced only a modest increase between 1870 and 1910.  In Lake County, black 
tenant farmers provided the necessary labor for expanding cotton production and, as cotton 
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acreage increased, so did the percentage of African Americans in the overall population.  
Between 1890 and 1910, the black population of Lake County grew from 1,075 people to 3,268.  
By 1910, African Americans comprised 39 percent of Lake County’s total population.24
The growing tide of African American laborers displaced the white farm workers who 
had previously dominated the market and commanded high prices for their labor.  The labor 
shortage that had plagued the area since the Civil War disappeared and agricultural wages sank 
as landlords freed themselves from the high cost of local white laborers.  The drop in wages 
revealed a schism between the perceptions of small farmers around Reelfoot and the mentality of 
the cotton economy.  By 1885, The Hickman Courier reported that “an increased supply of 
labor” had lowered farm prices and created a localized depression around Hickman.
   
25  The 1884 
Report on Cotton Production in the United States, reported that cotton wages in Tennessee were 
“about $10 per month, including board.”  However, the extreme western section of the state fell 
outside the norm by offering wages that averaged twelve dollars a month.26
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, small farmers throughout Tennessee 
struggled to remain economically viable as market conditions and the recession of 1893-1897 
pressed farmers toward indebtedness and tenancy.
  To a local 
newspaper, a drop in wages from around twenty dollars a month to approximately twelve dollars 
a month looked like an economic depression; from the perspective of the national cotton market, 
twelve dollars a month was two dollars too much. 
27
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labor-intensive tobacco to fund their struggle against tenancy, but at the turn of the twentieth 
century, it was not enough.  Between 1880 and 1890, tenancy rates in Obion County dropped, 
falling from 37 percent to 25 percent in 1890, but the last decade of the nineteenth century was 
devastating.  Earlier gains disappeared as tenancy rates in Obion County rose to 52 percent by 
1900.  Across the state, the average farm size declined between 1880 and 1910, dropping from 
124.8 acres to 81.5.28  In Obion County, remaining above the state average required farm 
ownership, not tenancy.  In 1900, tenant farms in Obion County averaged just over 54 acres.29
On the other side of Reelfoot, Lake County’s tenancy rate was already 75 percent in 
1880.  During the 1880s, counties statewide experienced a drop in tenancy similar to the 
reduction in Obion County.  The tenancy rate in Lake County defied this trend, rising along with 
cotton production.  Tenants made up 80 percent of Lake County’s farmers in 1890 and 83 
percent in 1900.
   
30
Obion’s farmers faced exacerbated versions of the poor agricultural conditions 
experienced by small farmers throughout the south and Tennessee during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  Between 1870 and 1900 cotton production rose by 170 percent as 
landowners opened new cotton lands, tenant farms stressed “cotton at the expense of food crops 
and the behest of landlords,” and small farmers across the South entered the cotton market.
  On both sides of Reelfoot Lake, tenancy became the reality of farm life for an 
increasing number of farmers, with neither cotton nor tobacco offering economic security. 
31
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Southern farmers faced a “lack of capital in a growing capitalistic society” that trapped them in a 
29 U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Agriculture 1900. 
30 U.S. Bureau of Census. Census of Agriculture 1880-1900. 
31 David B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
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cycle of tenancy, indebtedness, and market production.32
Steven Hahn detailed how the deteriorating conditions and spreading poverty that 
accompanied the expansion of the cotton economy into Upcountry Georgia transformed the 
relationship between white owners of small farms and large landowners.  In the years 
immediately following the Civil War, Georgia’s small farmers viewed increased participation in 
the cotton economy as a way to escape accumulated debt.  As in Lake County, Upcountry 
Georgian farmers had principally produced corn prior to the Civil War but turned to cotton as the 
primary market crop in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
  As southern farmers found their path 
to economic prosperity blocked, nineteenth century agrarian reform movements took root. 
33  The cycle of debt, capital 
shortfalls, and market production that plagued farmers as cotton prices fell altered traditional 
community relationships.  The mechanisms of tenancy and debt that tied laborers to the land and 
insured the profitability of landlords and merchants simultaneously devastated small farmers and 
threatened their economic independence.  The new agricultural order, wrote Hahn, “arrayed the 
values of the free market against the republicanism of petty producers.”34  As tenancy and debt 
replaced the bonds of mutual dependency, which had previously connected farmers to wealthier 
neighbors, small farmers lost social and political influence along with their economic 
independence.  In an ideological conflict that pitted small farmers against large landowners 
aligned with urban citizens, landowners “began a process of redefining use rights, a process of 
enlarging absolute and exclusive property.”35
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In Georgia, the years following the Civil War brought numerous forces to bear against 
the economic aspirations of Upcountry farmers.  Most small farmers had little capital investment 
in slavery, but they shared planters’ ideological investment in the institution.  In the antebellum 
period, the rolling hills and short growing season of northern Georgia insulated Upcountry 
farmers from the physical spread of cotton cultivation while the institution of slavery protected 
whites from planters’ demands for cheap, ready labor.  In the aftermath of the Civil War, both 
the physical and ideological barriers collapsed.  New fertilizers enabled farmers to grow cotton 
in northern Georgia despite the shortened season.  Lured into the cotton economy by the high 
price of cotton relative to corn, small white farmers found themselves trapped along with 
freedmen in a cycle of debt and market production.   
Farmers in Tennessee were not uniformly bound to cotton, but they were caught in the 
same trap.  During the late nineteenth century, the small and medium farmers in the Ninth 
Congressional District, which included Obion and Lake Counties, “appeared as the state’s most 
significant problem” when measured by farm size, tenancy, or mortgage indebtedness.36  Despite 
excellent soil, a long tradition of independent farmers, and ready access to markets, Obion’s 
farmers struggled.  In the 1880s, the Agricultural Wheel and the Farmers’ Alliance spread 
quickly throughout the Ninth Congressional District and reinforced existing community 
connections between independent producers.  In Obion County, these associations joined large 
and small farmers on issues of agrarian uplift and reform. 37
                                                 
36 Lester, 37. 
   
37 Lester, 75 and 89. Lester argues that religion and location connected J. M. Glasgow, president of the 
Obion County Alliance in 1890 and eventual delegate to the Populist Congressional Nominating Convention, to 
more substantial farmers, although he owned only ten acres of land. 
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During the 1880s, small farmers looking to better their situation could wield significant 
political influence in Tennessee due to the disparate voting patterns within the state’s three grand 
divisions.  During the 1880s, the white Republican stronghold in East Tennessee and the 
concentration of black voters in urban centers made “Tennessee’s the most competitive politics” 
in the south.38  White, Republican East Tennessee prevented the Democrats from achieving the 
statewide dominance that the party typically exerted in the Solid South.  During the late 
nineteenth century, the Republican Party posed a real and vibrant threat to Democratic power 
across the state.  J. Morgan Kousser found that prior to disfranchisement “white wealth 
correlated very strongly (+.72) with the proportion of Negroes in the population.”  Coupled with 
Republican strength in Tennessee’s “poor mountain and hill counties,” strong African American 
support in the middle and western sections of the state made the Republican Party a persistent 
threat to Democratic rule.39
In this competitive political environment, Obion County’s small farmers retained 
significant influence on local politics.  James C. Harris arrived in Lake County shortly after the 
Civil War and gradually began clearing timber, draining swamps, cultivating cotton on the 
cleared land, and reinvesting his earnings in additional land purchases.  Harris’ landholdings 
grew rapidly and by 1890, he was one of the largest landholders in the region.
 
40
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Small farmers, however, viewed him as an exploitive landlord and “grasping wealth seeker.”41  
When James C. Harris ran for the general assembly, Obion County farmers defeated his bid by 
organizing support around “a traditional yardstick of community expectations within a network 
of exchange relations.”42
In a viable two party system, rural Democrats commanded significant power, but in 1888, 
the Democratic Party launched an offensive that reshaped Tennessee’s political environment.  By 
the late 1880s, African American voters in Memphis and Shelby County had helped Republicans 
maintain dominance in the Tenth Congressional District since the Civil War.  In the 1888 
elections, Democrats seized control of previously Republican districts though blatant fraud.  
Some areas in Memphis reported Democratic majorities that exceeded the number of available 
voters.
  During the 1880s, the united small farmers of Obion County could 
organize sufficient political resistance to defeat a large planter who had become rich on the backs 
of his tenants.   
43
In 1890, the Alliance turned to state politics, with Obion and the surrounding counties 
leading “other Tennessee farmers into what became an agrarian revolt.”
   
44
                                                 
41 Lester, 225. 
  John H. McDowell 
returned to Tennessee after living in Arkansas around 1877 and settled in Obion County.  From 
1883 to 1889, he served as a representative of Obion County in the Tennessee General 
Assembly, serving one term in the house and two in the senate.  Between 1884 and 1887, the 
Agricultural Wheel and the Farmers’ Alliance formed in Tennessee; the organizations merged in 
1889 under the name of the Farmers’ Alliance.  McDowell served as the state secretary of the 
42 Lester, 235 and 231. 
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Wheel and later, the Alliance.  He also served as editor of the state Alliance publication, the 
Weekly Toiler.  In 1890, when the Alliance sought to “capture the Democratic party in the 
southern states and, through it, to place their members or friends” in office, McDowell was 
instrumental in the effort to elect John Price Buchanan, president of the state Alliance, to the 
governorship.45
The Alliance succeeded in seizing control of the Democratic Party and electing 
Buchanan.  Newly elected agrarian representatives joined the Democratic representatives of 
areas like the Tenth Congressional District in establishing election laws that restricted the 
elective franchise and ensured the ongoing dominance of the Democratic Party in Tennessee.  
Although these laws were subtler in their language than later laws enacted in many other 
southern states, they were equally concerned with limiting the African American vote.  The 
Myers Law required voter registration at least 20 days prior to elections in towns with more than 
500 voters.  The Dortch Law, which required a single, secret ballot rather than a party ballot, 
required voters to select a candidate from a series organized by office, not by party.  
Representatives from poorer areas were wary of the Dortch Law, fearing that the new system 
would disfranchise many white voters as well as African Americans because it “demanded not 
merely literacy, but fluency in reading English.”
  
46
Although V. O. Key argued that the disfranchising laws erected across the South during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely codified a disfranchising process that 
fraud, intimidation, and violence had already accomplished, Kousser found that, in Tennessee, 
  The legislature also passed a poll tax despite 
concerns among some representatives that the measure would eliminate many white voters.   
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the process of disfranchisement leaned heavily on the formidable barriers erected through these 
election laws.  Black voter participation plummeted in 1890.  After the institution of the poll tax, 
Union City in Obion County attributed a very small voter turnout among blacks to the new law.  
Without African American voters, the Republican strength in Shelby County evaporated.  By 
1896, African American voter participation in Tennessee fell to almost zero.47
To avoid catching poor whites in a snare intended for urban blacks, the initial legislation 
limited the secret ballot to Tennessee’s four urban centers.  This accommodation likely mitigated 
but did not erase the effect of the new laws on poor whites.  Over the next decade, the new 
voting laws expanded across the state.  By 1901, the secret ballot requirement applied to over 80 
percent of the state’s population.  The effects of the new legislation were particularly potent in 
Middle and West Tennessee.  Between 1884 and 1906, the Democratic margin in gubernatorial 
elections rose from 15 percent to a high of 46 percent.
   
48  By 1890, “the new qualifications for 
eligibility to vote – registration and the poll tax – were mowing down thousands of white voters 
all over the state.”49  Statewide, voter participation fell by 100,000 between the election of 1888 
and 1890.  President of the state Farmers’ Alliance and Democratic candidate John P. Buchanan 
received 43,400 fewer votes than the previous governor, agrarian-friendly Robert Love Taylor, 
received in 1888.  Tennessee Populists claimed that the poll tax provision eliminated 50,000 
voters.50
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small landowners.  J. C. Harris succeeded in his bid for the Tennessee General Assembly, 
representing Obion, Lake, and Dyer Counties.51
Although some historians have argued that Buchanan and the other Alliance 
representatives were nothing more than Bourbon Democrats with a farmer’s tan, Connie Lester 
argued that the agrarians posed a direct threat to the power structure of the Democratic Party.
 
52  
The new agrarian representatives largely voted along Democratic Party lines, but the Democratic 
establishment recognized the threat that rural insurgency posed to existing party interests and 
they responded with vehemence.  Democratic opponents of the new agrarian political movement 
turned on John H. McDowell, who succeeded Buchanan as the president of the state Alliance, as 
the power behind the movement and “the symbol of agrarian radicalism” in Tennessee.53  When 
Governor Buchanan, under pressure from the Democratic establishment, refused to break with 
McDowell, Democratic newspapers launched “violent attacks upon [Buchanan] as McDowell’s 
‘tool,’ and upon McDowell himself as the arch-enemy of the Democratic party.”54  In the pages 
of the Democratic press, McDowell “was credited with being the brains in the effort to disrupt 
the party and to destroy white supremacy in the state.”55
McDowell became a lightning rod for Democratic resistance to the agrarian political 
movement, but he was not the only reform-minded politician to emerge from Obion County.  As 
a member of the Farmers’ Alliance and the congressional representative from the Ninth 
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Congressional District, Democrat Rice A. Pierce supported antitrust measures, a farm mortgage 
bill, and a graduated income tax.  An open supporter of the subtreasury plan, Pierce left the 
Democratic Party in 1892 and ran as an Independent Populist.  He was defeated by Democrat 
James C. McDearmon. 
Both McDowell and Pierce were reluctant to leave the Democratic Party, but both men 
felt that Democratic resistance and the national Alliance’s support for the new People’s Party 
forced their hands.  Pierce bolted from the Democratic Party but readily returned when the 
Democrats moved to free silver.  Once departed, McDowell resisted the move back to the 
Democrats, but the mass of agrarian reform voters did not.  When the Populists endorsed 
William Jennings Bryan in the 1896 presidential campaign and Edward W. Carmack bellowed 
the new commitment of Tennessee Democrats to agrarian reform, Pierce joined the rush of 
voters returning to Tennessee’s Democratic Party.  Running as a Silver Democrat, Pierce 
defeated his former ally in agrarian reform, John H. McDowell.56
As small farmers’ lost the powerful influence that they had previously held in state 
politics, their ability to exert influence over local issues also declined.  Steven Hahn identified 
the debate over fence laws as particularly illustrative of the schism between large landowners 
and small farmers in Georgia’s expanding cotton economy.  Traditional land use rights required 
farmers to fence crops against livestock and permitted farmers to graze stock freely on 
undeveloped land.  Free-range stock provided vital supplemental income for farmers struggling 
to raise capital in uncertain market conditions.  Under this system, farmers did not have to 
choose between raising crops or livestock for market.  Poor farmers and tenants could devote 
   
                                                 
56 Lester, Mudsills, 167-8, 195, 204. 
 48 
 
their small farms to the production of market crops, while market stock grazed the open range.  
Even animals not sold for market, like mules and cows, required less of an investment under 
free-range laws, since farmers needed to grow only enough fodder to maintain them over the 
winter, not year-round.  In the fight over fencing laws, both sides understood what was at stake. 
In his study of the patterns of stock laws in the south, J. Crawford King Jr. found that 
“areas made up mainly of white independent farmers who owned their own land and were not 
tied exclusively to cotton production remained open range longer than more populous areas with 
a higher percentage of blacks, tenancy, and cotton production.”57  This pattern was not 
accidental.  In areas where the cotton harvest required rapid access to a ready labor force, 
landholders’ greatest fear was that black tenets would acquire sufficient resources to drop out of 
the labor pool.58  Both small farmers and landowners knew that a mule or the income from hogs 
could allow tenants the economic freedom to negotiate a better deal.  Restricting access to open 
range and limiting the size of tenant farms allowed landowners to convert more of their land to 
cotton production while denying tenants’ access to the additional income provided by open range 
stock.  In areas with a high population of small white farmers, opponents of fence laws were able 
to forestall the closure of the open range, but their power was slipping.59
Unlike in Georgia, stock laws in Tennessee never became a statewide political issue.  In 
Georgia, fence laws were decided by local option voting, while in Tennessee the state legislature 
first had to approve a local vote on fencing.  As a result, the state of Tennessee officially retained 
its open range until 1947.  Although there was no large-scale political fight over fencing in 
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Tennessee, enclosure was occurring on a county level throughout the early twentieth century as 
urban residents and landowners sought rules and regulations that elevated the primacy of private 
property rights and infringed on traditional rights and activities.  In 1907, Tennessee’s state 
legislature considered bills enabling seven counties to vote on stock laws.60
For twenty years, small farmers on Reelfoot Lake’s eastern shore struggled to maintain 
economic independence amid Lake County’s rapidly expanding cotton economy, and that 
independence relied, in part, on traditional land rights.  Around Reelfoot Lake, farmers pastured 
their livestock on undeveloped land and the grassy peninsulas that stretched into the lake, but by 
the early twentieth century local enclosure efforts threatened farmer access to traditional public 
spaces and resources.  In early 1909, a “municipal squabble” over fence laws in Hickman was 
resolved when citizens on both sides of the issue consented to a compromise.  Animals would be 
fenced in the central town district, but allowed to roam freely in other areas.  During times of 
high water, when the outlying areas flooded, unfenced livestock would be allowed to wander into 
the central district unmolested.
  
61  While farmers near Hickman retained sufficient leverage to 
force compromise, Obion County farmers, economically and socially reduced by agricultural 
changes, faced the consequences of a far different outcome.  The free range finally closed 
throughout Obion County in 1913, when local authorities enacted $2 to $5 fines for any stock 
running at large.62
In Hickman, small farmers still commanded enough respect to demand a compromise on 
issues of private property that threatened their economic well-being, but in Lake County 
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landlords had already succeeded in elevating private property rights over the farmers’ philosophy 
of common rights.  In the mid-1870s, agricultural leaders, including Tennessee Commissioner of 
Agriculture, J. B. Killebrew, advocated raising sheep as an alternative to cotton or tobacco.  
Proponents of the sheep industry and supporters of strong private property rights argued that 
roaming dogs caused losses to flocks and that people who owned large numbers of dogs 
generally did not own property.  In the ensuing debate, property owners supported dog laws 
while small farmers and poor renters, who relied on working and hunting dogs, argued that the 
laws were burdensome and unfair.  The state law initially passed in the General Assembly, but 
voter opposition forced repeal of the state tax.63  Statewide, private property owners lost the 
political fight against farmers and renters, but in Lake County, where the tenancy rate was high 
even before the explosion of the cotton economy, landowners had more power.  Lake County 
residents paid a $2 local tax for the privilege of owning a dog.64
In Obion County, the cotton economy and its accompanying changes had altered the 
physical, economic, and social landscape.  In 1874, when the cotton economy was just gaining a 
toehold in the region, Tennessee’s Commissioner of Agriculture portrayed Lake County’s 
farmers as isolated and unprogressive.  By the first decade of the twentieth century, the urban 
residents of Union City and the white landowners of Lake County believed that the farmers on 
the Obion side of the lake were course, uneducated, and backward.
 
65
The strength of the agrarian reform movement in Obion County was so strong that Obion 
County’s reformers continued to strive for political inclusion despite the collapse of the agrarian 
revolt on the state and national level in 1896, the continual loss of their influence on local 
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concerns, and the accompanying loss of their social status.  Both Roger Hart and William Majors 
stressed that, even between the Republicans and Democrats, local affiliations and loyalties 
influenced Tennessee politics more heavily than other factors.  In Tennessee, political affiliations 
formed and reformed as politicians united and separated around specific issues.  Agrarian 
dissenters in Tennessee may not have embraced the overthrow of the Democratic Party, but they 
wanted representatives to address rural concerns.  Tennesseans adopted portions of the national 
agrarian reform movement that resonated with the struggles they faced.  Some aspects of the 
national movement, like railroad reform, garnered little support in Tennessee.  Meanwhile, the 
invocation of trusts became a mnemonic for the political, social, and economic forces that 
agrarian reformers opposed.  During the late nineteenth century, “the fear of the loss of 
individual freedom to the power of money and monopoly resonated through the social, political, 
and economic language like the strains of a familiar hymn.”66  In Tennessee, the extreme 
hostility toward trusts was sufficient to arouse suspicions about corporations in general.67
By 1906, Democrats across the south had enacted election laws that disfranchised 
political opposition and positioned the Democratic Party primaries as the principle battleground 
for most elected positions.
   
68  Although William Majors argued that “the upstart farmer 
organization…was crushed…with relative ease” during Tennessee’s 1892 election, the political 
fortunes of Pierce and McDowell reveal that, even after election reforms, the political impulse 
for agrarian reform survived among Obion County voters into the twentieth century.69
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1896 and served from 1897 until 1905.  In 1904, the voters of Obion County also returned 
McDowell to political office, where he served in the Tennessee General Assembly from 1905 to 
1907.  Both McDowell and Pierce were well-known advocates of agrarian reform, and neither 
man’s views changed substantially during the period.  In Tennessee and across the south, when 
Democrats raised the specter of “Negro domination” and extended the olive branch of free silver, 
voters returned to the Democratic fold, but their original concerns persisted after Populism’s 
collapse.  In Obion County, voters returned vocal agrarian advocates to office well after the 
national collapse of the Populist Party as a political threat to the Democrats.   
Obion farmers’ continuing faith in Populist politicians likely suggests the strength of 
local loyalties in Tennessee politics instead of the expectation among farmers that agrarian 
representatives would enact real improvements on their behalf.  At the height of the agrarian 
revolt, Obion voters re-elected agrarian representatives, but agricultural conditions continued to 
decline.  At the turn of the twentieth century, farmers’ ability to rise from tenancy to land 
ownership had stagnated across the South.70
Even more importantly for Obion County farmers, Lake County landlords derived their 
wealth and authority from Lake County’s rich, productive soil and James C. Harris’s process of 
land acquisition had created the dramatic wealth disparity that separated Obion’s farmers from 
Lake County’s landlords.  James Harris built his fortune by buying land, selling the timber, 
  In the new cotton economy, once a farmer fell into 
tenancy declining agricultural conditions, shrinking tenant farms, and the cotton economy’s 
cycle of debt and dependency virtually ensured that he would remain a tenant.  As a result, land 
ownership was vital for economic success.   
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draining the swamps and marshes, and leasing the newly created farm to tenants.  As the cotton 
economy grew, Harris’ model for converting swamps to farms became increasingly profitable.  
Successful replication of this pattern required available capital and swampland that offered soil 
characteristics like those of Lake County’s existing farms.  The cotton economy provided Harris 
and other landlords with ample capital, but tiny Lake County offered limited land.  For James C. 
Harris, the solution lay underneath Reelfoot Lake.  He began buying deeds to the land under the 
lake in the 1800s.  In 1899, he announced ownership of Reelfoot Lake and began preparations to 
drain the lake and expose the rich bottomland for cotton cultivation, but lake residents blocked 
his effort through court challenges.71
In nearby Arkansas, similar efforts to drain areas flooded by the Mississippi uncovered 
some of the richest farmland in the South.  Between 1880 and 1930, Arkansas’ drainage projects 
transformed the sparsely settled Arkansas Delta into one of the most densely settled agricultural 
regions in the South.  In the Arkansas Delta, these newly uncovered swamps provided rich cotton 
fields, establishing cotton as a more important crop in the decades after the Civil War than the 
staple had been before the war.  Large landowners benefited from these rich farmlands even as 
cotton prices slid during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As farmland emerged 
from Arkansas’ swamps, the demand for tenant farmers and sharecroppers increased.
   
72
                                                 
71 Vanderwood, 10-12. 
  Historian 
Donald Holley wrote that, “Thus land clearing and drainage projects coincided with a spectacular 
72 John Solomon Otto, The Final Frontiers, 1880-1930: Settling the Southern Bottomlands (Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999).  
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increase in landless farmers.”73
James C. Harris never solidified his claim to the lake.  He died in 1903 and his son, Judge 
Harris, inherited his father’s land, including the titles to the lake.  In 1908, Judge Harris, the 
largest landlord in Lake County, also owned the majority of the land beneath Reelfoot Lake.   
  In draining Reelfoot Lake, Harris likely hoped to duplicate the 
successes of landowners on the other side of the Mississippi.   
In the spring of 1908, after years of legal battles in which lake residents contended that 
the lake was public, not private property, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that Reelfoot Lake 
was subject to private ownership.  John Shaw and Walter Pleasant, local merchants who had 
fought private ownership of the lake, and their lawyers, Captain Quentin Rankin and Colonel 
Robert Z. Taylor, acquired the outstanding deeds and forced Judge Harris into a land 
corporation, the West Tennessee Land Company.  The new corporation leased commercial 
fishing rights on Reelfoot Lake to John Carlos Burdick.   
In an interview with Paul Vanderwood, a former night rider claimed that the band formed 
shortly after the West Tennessee Land Company leased fishing rights on the lake to J. C. 
Burdick, drawing their inspiration from tobacco night riders.74
                                                 
73 Donald Holley, “The Plantation Heritage: Agriculture in the Arkansas Delta,” in The Arkansas Delta: 
Land of Paradox, ed. Jeannie M. Whayne and Willard B. Gatewood (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 
1993), 257. 
  Obion’s small farmers sat at the 
edge of the Black Patch, a tobacco-growing region between Paducah, Kentucky and Nashville, 
Tennessee.  In the early years of the twentieth century, the purchasing tactics of urban tobacco 
trusts transformed traditional tobacco markets.  The American Tobacco Company and the Italian 
Regie, which purchased tobacco for the Italian government, instituted purchasing practices that 
forced tobacco planters to accept low prices for their crops.  The companies divided the region 
74 Vanderwood, 21. 
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into districts and assigned a single purchaser to each area.  Rather than purchasing through local 
buyers who graded the crop, the buyer within each district graded the crop and set the price he 
was willing to pay.  These buyers were accountable to the tobacco companies, not the local 
communities, and because no buyer would cross into another buyer’s district, farmers had little 
recourse when the buyer judged fine tobacco poor or set an unreasonably low price.  Local elites, 
merchants, and planters united to confront the monopolistic practices that had destroyed the local 
tobacco markets.  In a partnership that arranged the local town and country against the tobacco 
trusts, “planters would fashion a modern organization to preserve a traditional structure.”75
In 1904, wealthy Tennessee planter Felix Grundy Ewing organized the Planters 
Protective Association (PPA).  “Propagandized as an agrarian response to the monopolistic 
practices of the tobacco trusts,” the PPA attempted to raise the prices offered by the tobacco 
trusts through collective bargaining.
  
76
                                                 
75 Christopher Waldrep, Night Riders: Defending Community in the Black Patch, 1890-1915 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993), chap. 2-3, 36. 
  Planters descended from Tennessee’s slaveholding 
aristocracy controlled the PPA, but the organization’s success depended on the widespread 
participation of tobacco growers of all sizes.  Ewing provoked violence by inciting members 
with appeals to traditional prejudices and female honor.  When members formed bands to coerce 
participation in the PPA, Ewing apparently believed he could harness community-based violence 
in support of the regional organization.  For a time, he was right.  Violence by members of the 
PPA began as community coercion in 1905 and gradually escalated to property destruction and 
personal attacks.  Initially, it appeared that the wealthy, influential planters of the PPA could 
direct the night riding and property destruction.  Between 1905 and 1907, local members of the 
76 Christopher Waldrep, “Planters and the Planter Protective Association in Kentucky and Tennesssee,” The 
Journal of Southern History 52, no. 4 (November 1986): 566. 
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PPA launched night riding attacks against farmers in their communities who criticized the 
association and warehouses containing trust tobacco.  The attacks were violent but targeted.  No 
one died.  Even when night riders blew up tobacco warehouses, the public sympathized with the 
planters’ efforts to protect their communities from exploitative monopolies, rather than with the 
tobacco companies.  With the PPA “convulsed in discord and violence,” vigilantism escalated.77
In 1907, Ewing lost control of the PPA’s enforcement wing.  According to Christopher 
Waldrep, the tobacco night riders “shattered their carefully cultivated image as defenders of 
community life” when 500 men from widely dispersed communities raided Hopkinsville, 
Kentucky.
   
78
Large planters saw black labor as a resource, but “white workers prospered when blacks 
were scarce” and many lower class whites viewed African Americans as economic 
competition.
  Hundreds of men traveling to a distant community to exact vengeance no longer 
seemed like community-supportive coercion.  After the Hopkinsville raid, the night riders looked 
more like a modern, uncontrollable mob.  With the planter elite no longer in control of the 
vigilante violence, lower class racism began to permeate the night riders’ attacks.   
79  In 1908, night riders launched a series of violent, racial attacks.  They attacked 
African Americans in Eddyville, Kentucky, shooting haphazardly into homes, whipping 
numerous people, and ordering blacks to leave town.  In March, they murdered two people, 
including a two-year-old, in Birmingham, Kentucky.  During the spring and summer of 1908, the 
night rider attacks became “less massive but more vicious.”80
                                                 
77 Tracy Campbell, The Politics of Despair: Power and Resistance in the Tobacco Wars ([Lexington]: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 115. 
  The vicious attacks worked.  After 
the Birmingham murders, seventeen black families left Kentucky for Tennessee on a single 
78 Waldrep, Night Riders, 97. 
79 Waldrep, Night Riders, 141. 
80 Waldrep, Night Riders, 151. 
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riverboat.  Felix Ewing believed he could use traditional vigilante violence to serve the PPA’s 
modern organizational goals, but by 1908 the night riders had wrenched free of the planter elites’ 
leadership. 
In 1908, no tobacco night riding was occurring in Hickman, but the editors of The 
Hickman Courier were sympathetic to the night riders’ efforts to support the Planters’ Protective 
Association through force.  The newspaper regularly reported incidents of night riding associated 
with the tobacco dispute.81  In March, the editor defined a night rider as “a good citizen, who for 
years has been robbed of his honest sweat and toil by the heartless tobacco trust.  He has 
submitted to this robbery patiently until the wolf of want is now staring his wife and children in 
the face, and as laws of our country have failed to furnish him relief.  …  [He] has taken the law 
into his own hands.”82
When the representatives from Obion County traveled to the Black Patch, the tobacco 
night riders had swerved away from controlled violence and were conducting violent, racist 
attacks aimed at driving away black laborers.  Reelfoot’s night riders reflected this influence.  
From the beginning, they conducted concurrent campaigns of community coercion and violent, 
racist attacks against African Americans.  
  According to the editor, the tobacco night riders were not simply 
protecting their interests, they were saving southern women and children from predators. 
Reelfoot Lake’s night riders organized in response to a threat to the lake, but their actions 
were not the knee-jerk response of startled traditionalists.  The night riders responded to thirty 
years of agricultural, social, and political changes wrought by the cotton economy.  Like Steven 
Hahn’s yeoman farmers, the forces accompanying the explosion of the cotton economy had 
                                                 
81 “Night Riders at Fulton,” March 8, 1909, 8; “Get Rid of Negroes,” March 27, 1909, 4; “No Night 
Riders,” March 27, 1909, 4; all in The Hickman Courier. 
82 Untitled, The Hickman Courier March 13, 1908, 1. 
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“pushed them to the wall.”83
                                                 
83 Hahn, 152. 
  Unlike Georgia’s smallholders, for the men who turned to night 
riding at Reelfoot Lake, Populism’s promise of dramatic reform had come and gone.  During the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conditions were bad for farmers across Tennessee, 
but in Obion County, conditions were worse.  The remarkably sudden development of a cotton 
empire brought a swift increase of black laborers, a dramatic reduction in wages, and a spike in 
tenancy and indebtedness.  Economically, socially, and politically Obion’s small farmers failed 
to hold their ground against the expanding cotton economy.  Lake County landlords’ patterns of 
land acquisition and property ownership funded the cotton economy and fueled the widening 
wealth disparities between Lake County landlords and Obion farmers.  When the West 
Tennessee Land Company threatened to impose these property patterns onto the lake itself, 
western Obion’s small farmers and farm laborers answered with violence.   
 59 
CHAPTER 3 
THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY COERCION 
Analyses of the Reelfoot Lake uprising lean heavily on the destruction of John Carlos 
Burdick’s fish docks in April 1908 and the murder of Captain Quentin Rankin in October 1908, 
the first and last crimes committed by the night riders.  These attacks targeted white men who 
were directly involved in the conflict over control of Reelfoot Lake, and the episodes support 
Paul Vanderwood’s conclusion that, in “reacting to modernization,” the night riders resisted 
private control of the lake through traditional methods of community coercion.1
From the beginning of the uprising, the night rider attacks at Reelfoot Lake interlaced 
different forms of violence.  Their initial attacks against whites contained elements of the type of 
violence that Christopher Waldrep characterized as traditional in that the attacks were targeted, 
restrained, and aimed at coercing the target to acquiesce to a specific demand.  The night rider 
attacks against African Americans look more like the type of violence that Christopher Waldrep 
  Traditional 
resistance certainly played a role in the property destruction at Burdick’s fish docks, but a 
number of the other crimes that the night riders committed between April and October, were 
unrelated to lake access.  Racism and shifting agricultural conditions motivated these other 
crimes, which culminated in the brutal massacre of Dave Walker and his family.  Although some 
crimes reflect efforts by the night riders to protect traditional rights through community coercion, 
the night riders also attacked the white representatives of the cotton economy and threatened the 
cotton economy’s labor force with vicious, terroristic attacks aimed at threatening all African 
Americans.   
                                                 
1 Kathy Krone, “Author Says Night Riders’ Struggle for Social Justice Now Mirrored in Iraq,” State 
Gazette, November 18, 2003, http://www.stategazette.com/story/1057873.html (accessed February 22, 2012). 
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characterized as modern and that Ted Robert Gurr categorized as vigilante terrorism.  The night 
rider attacks against African Americans were vicious, infused with racism, and often deadly.2
By 1908, locals had contested private ownership of Reelfoot Lake for decades.  During 
the 1860s, W. M. Wilson of Obion County, one of the largest landholders in the region, held title 
to land under the lake.  Although Wilson did not attempt to restrict local access to the lake, he 
leased commercial fishing rights to J. C. Burdick and the right to draw logs from the lake to John 
Ratliff.  Burdick and Ratliff paid the leases, but other residents continued to fish and draw logs 
from the lake as well.  When Wilson opposed residents removing the valuable walnut logs that 
Ratliff had leased the right to sale, locals threatened to “make fish bait of him.”
   
3  Eventually both 
Burdick and Ratliff refused to pay further on contracts that did not insure exclusive commercial 
access.  Wilson, unsure of the soundness of his claim, refused to press the issue and eventually 
sold the titles to the lake.4
After Wilson’s attempt to lease commercial logging and fishing rights, the debate over 
access to the lake ebbed and flowed in Obion and Lake Counties.  In 1897, sportsmen from 
Louisville, Kentucky purchased tracts around Reelfoot with the intention of restricting access to 
members of their urban sporting club.  Locals threatened the surveyors hired to establish precise 
boundaries for the club.  When the company attempted to prevent locals from removing timber 
from the lake, a group of vigilantes threatened the sportsmen.  In 1898, after only a year of local 
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resistance, the sporting company sold its holdings to James C. Harris, who attempted to drain the 
lake.5
In 1902, J. C. Burdick led an effort among Obion County’s smallholders to prevent 
Harris from draining the lake.  Although the chancery court initially ruled that Reelfoot Lake was 
not subject to private control and enjoined Harris from draining the lake, Harris hired lawyers 
James Deason, Quentin Rankin, and Seid Waddell to appeal his claim to the Tennessee Supreme 
Court.  The court ruled that Reelfoot Lake was subject to private ownership but upheld the 
injunction preventing Harris from draining the lake, arguing that Harris had not conclusively 
proven ownership of all the necessary titles.
   
6
Judge Harris inherited the lake deeds on his father’s death in 1903.  In 1905, Judge Harris 
purchased the outstanding deeds to Reelfoot Lake and sought to have the chancery court enjoin 
anyone from using the lake without permission.  John Shaw and Walter Pleasant, partners in a 
fish business on the Obion County side of Reelfoot Lake, hired James Deason, Quentin Rankin, 
and Robert Z. Taylor to contest Harris’ claim.  They argued that Harris could not assert 
ownership of the lake because the Galloway grants, which Harris did not own, included portions 
of land underneath the water.  The court agreed that Harris could not assert control of the lake 
without these additional grants.
   
7
In 1907, James Deason, Quentin Rankin, and Robert Z. Taylor purchased the remaining 
grants to Reelfoot Lake and forced Harris into a land corporation that also included John Shaw 
   
                                                 
5 Vanderwood, 9-10; Connie Lester, Up From the Mudsills of Hell, (Athens: University of Georgia, 2006), 
225-226. 
6 Vanderwood, 11. 
7 Vanderwood, 12. 
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and Walter Pleasant.8  The decision issued by the Tennessee Supreme Court and upheld during 
the subsequent case in chancery court held that the West Tennessee Land Company had full 
control over Reelfoot Lake and its resources.  According to Vanderwood, the locals at Reelfoot 
were “baffled by legal intransigence” and felt “bewildered,” “cheated” and “betrayed” when the 
lawyers purchased the remaining land grants and forced Harris into a land partnership.9
Taylor and Rankin were not simply distant lawyers who turned against the residents of 
Reelfoot Lake for profit; they were the lawyers who represented Shaw and Pleasant.  Shaw and 
Pleasant hired Deason, Taylor, and Rankin, two of whom had represented Harris before the state 
supreme court, to oppose Harris’ ownership claim in chancery court.  After the court agreed that 
only one set of grants prevented Harris from claiming full ownership of the lake, the lawyers 
“quietly purchased the grants in question, paying $300 for the valuable land to the Galloway 
heirs, two elderly ladies in Columbia, Tennessee.”
 
10  The lawyers may have purchased the 
outstanding grants and organized the effort to press Harris into a land company, but when the 
West Tennessee Land Company organized, their most recent clients, Shaw and Pleasant, each 
owned 75 shares of the new company.11
Unlike most of the men who became night riders, Shaw and Pleasant were not farmers; 
both men relied on fishing income for their livelihood.  Locals were anxious that Judge Harris, 
  It seems that two local fish dealers, working through 
lawyers familiar with both sides of the Reelfoot case, removed the final obstacle to the private 
ownership of Reelfoot Lake.   
                                                 
8 Vanderwood, 12-13; Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Directors of the West Tennessee Land 
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9 Vanderwood, 13-15. 
10 Vanderwood, 12. 
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like his father James, intended to drain Reelfoot Lake for expanded cotton cultivation.12
If Shaw and Pleasant’s intent was to protect the lake that provided their livelihood, they 
succeeded.  The injunction against draining the lake remained in effect, but the newly formed 
West Tennessee Land Company displayed a distinct interest in maintaining the lake.  On October 
29, 1907, Harris, Taylor, Pleasant, and Rankin submitted a joint letter to the Board of Directors 
recommending, “It would be manifestly to the best interest of the company as well as to the best 
interest of the surrounding country to preserve at all seasons of the year a uniform state of water 
in Reelfoot Lake.”
  By 
forcing Harris into a partnership, Shaw and Pleasant restrained Harris’ ability to claim unilateral 
control of the lake.  Locals may have perceived the partnership as a betrayal, but the creation of 
the land company was, in many ways, the obvious resolution to the ongoing dispute.  Given 
Harris’ wealth, his land claims, his desire to control the lake, and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 
ruling that a private entity could own and control Reelfoot Lake, Shaw and Pleasant likely 
assumed Harris would eventually acquire the remaining deeds.  Rather than waiting for Harris to 
purchase the grants, Shaw and Pleasant’s lawyers bought the property and forced Harris into a 
corporation.   
13  To maintain a standard water level, they recommended removing 
obstructions blocking the lake’s natural outlets.  When the land company began clearing the 
outlets, The Hickman Courier assured readers that the company was not draining the lake.  The 
improved drainage would open many acres of land for cultivation by exposing flooded areas that 
dried during late summer but were flooded during planting season while improving fishing by 
allowing the fish a “better chance to run into the lake out of the Mississippi River.”14
                                                 
12 Vanderwood, 11-12. 
  With an 
13 Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Directors of the West Tennessee Land Company, 8. 
14 “Not Draining the Lake,” The Hickman Courier, February 28, 1908, 6. 
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injunction preventing the company from draining the lake and shareholders with a distinct 
interest in fishing on Reelfoot Lake, the West Tennessee Land Company pursued a compromise 
between existing lake resources and expanded cotton cultivation. 
On October 18, 1907, J. C. Burdick leased fishing rights from the West Tennessee Land 
Company.  Burdick’s involvement with the company arose from motivations similar to Shaw’s 
and Pleasant’s.  In 1880, J. C. Burdick was one of only a handful of men who were identified as 
fishermen around Reelfoot Lake.15  As early as 1887, The Hickman Courier reported “the fish 
trade of the lake, which Mr. Burdick controls, all comes to Hickman for shipment.”16  By 1899, 
Burdick was shipping fish to market through Union City as well.17  Although Burdick led the 
earlier effort to resist private ownership of the lake through the courts, he had also spent 30 years 
building a livelihood that required commercial fishing access to Reelfoot Lake.  When the West 
Tennessee Land Company overcame the legal obstacles preventing private ownership of the 
lake, Burdick contracted with them for fishing rights and pressed his claim through the courts.18  
In February and March of 1908, the chancery court upheld injunctions preventing fishermen 
from selling fish for profit through merchants other than Burdick.19
When the night riders formed at Reelfoot Lake, John Shaw, Walter Pleasant, J. C. 
Burdick, Quentin Rankin, and James Deason were natural targets for their ire.  All of these men 
had fought for public access to the lake before partnering with Judge Harris to exert private 
control over Reelfoot.  Quentin Rankin and James Deason were not local, but Shaw, Pleasant, 
and Burdick were.  Around the last week of March, the local men began receiving threats.  J. C. 
 
                                                 
15 U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Population and Housing: Population: Tennessee: Obion County: 1880 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, 1880).  
16 Untitled, The Hickman Courier, March 18, 1887, 3. 
17 Weekly Statement, J. C. Burdick and W. E. Webster, Betty Wood Papers, Obion County Public Library, 
Union City, TN. 
18 Vanderwood, 12-15. 
19 “Reelfoot Lake Fishing,” The Hickman Courier, March 27, 1908, 4. 
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Burdick reported receiving a letter in Union City: “On the front side of the envelope there was a 
coffin and [the] words, “In Hell he lifted up his eyes.”20  Despite the threats, Shaw, Pleasant, and 
Burdick continued operations.  On April 11, 1908, night riders kidnapped John Shaw, forced him 
to provide kerosene from his general store, and marched him to Burdick’s fish docks where they 
used Shaw as a human shield and burned Burdick’s docks with the fuel from Shaw’s store.21
Shaw and Pleasant abandoned the legal fight only after the Tennessee Supreme Court 
ruled on the matter.  Guided by that seemingly final decision, they successfully navigated the 
legal and bureaucratic obstacles that frustrated many smallholders but failed to account for the 
power of local pressure.  Unlike Judge Harris, Shaw and Pleasant lived among Obion’s other 
smallholders and lacked the wealth necessary to erect buffers between themselves and their 
neighbors.  Just days after the burning of Burdick’s fish docks, John Shaw sold his interest in the 
West Tennessee Land Company to Quentin Rankin.  Walter Pleasant sold his shares to Robert Z. 
Taylor.
   
22
Unlike Shaw and Pleasant, if Tennessee had an aristocracy, it included Quentin Rankin 
and Robert Z. Taylor.  Captain Rankin was a veteran of the Spanish-American War, a Vanderbilt 
graduate, and a respected attorney.  Sixty-year-old Robert Z. Taylor was a veteran of the Civil 
War and a respected attorney.  In the fall of 1907, Robert Z. Taylor’s son, Vanderbilt football 
star Hillsman Taylor, had married Senator Robert L. Taylor’s daughter, Katherine.
   
23
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21 Vanderwood, 34-35. 
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man lived near Reelfoot Lake.  Shaw, Pleasant, Rankin, and Taylor believed that wealth, status, 
and distance insulated Rankin and Taylor from community coercion.24
Although the burning of Burdick’s docks convinced Shaw and Pleasant to withdraw from 
involvement in the West Tennessee Land Company, Burdick persisted.  In April, local vigilantes 
visited the building owner who rented Burdick commercial space in Hickman and threatened 
arson unless Burdick’s business closed.  Although the property owner claimed that both he and 
Burdick knew the vigilantes, he would not name them.  Unable to maintain property insurance 
on a building specifically targeted for arson, the building owner forced Burdick to close.
   
25
In May, the night riders threatened P. C. Ward for selling fish caught in Reelfoot Lake 
and warned that, as long as there were fees associated with commercial fishing, “no one [could] 
fish for profit on Reelfoot Lake.”
   
26  Burdick reopened his business in Hickman, claiming that he 
would not buy any fish from the lake.27  By August, Burdick attempted a permanent solution to 
his difficulties obtaining fish from Reelfoot Lake.  Burdick and Sheriff J. E. Finch partnered to 
lease the commercial fishing rights on the lake.  Sheriff Finch undoubtedly appreciated the 
potential economic benefits of a partnership with Burdick, while Burdick expected that the 
sheriff’s involvement would provide protection and reduce the threat of violence.  When Burdick 
and Finch launched their partnership, the editor at The Hickman Courier reported that people 
generally anticipated the partnership to end the unrest over fishing rights at Reelfoot.28
                                                 
24 “Sold Interest in Land,” The Hickman Courier, April 24, 1908, 1. 
  By 
October, T. J. Easterwood had replaced John Finch as Sheriff of Obion County, but Finch 
25 J. C. Burdick Deposition  
26 “Hickmanites Get Their First View of Night Riders,” The Hickman Courier, May 15, 1908, 1. 
27 Untitled, The Hickman Courier, May 15, 1908, 6. 
28 “Reelfoot Troubles End,” Hopkinsville Kentuckian, August 29, 1908, 4. 
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remained confident that the residents around Reelfoot Lake remained “well pleased with his 
incumbency” in the fishing business.29
In spite of burning Burdick’s docks, the night riders failed to end the property claims of 
the West Tennessee Land Company, but they did drive local representatives from the 
organization, leaving it completely controlled by Judge Harris and a group of lawyer partners.  
Burdick persevered, enacting tactics aimed at reducing the threat of coercive violence.  
According to The Hickman Courier, fishermen largely appreciated Burdick’s efforts to restore 
commercial fishing.  In August, the newspaper reported, “The fishermen greeted the 
announcement that fish would be bought right away with pleasure.  They have practically been 
without means of making a livelihood for several months past…They are glad to get back to 
work.”
   
30
On April 24, night rider activities dominated the front page of The Hickman Courier.  In 
addition to the closure of J. C. Burdick’s fish business, the paper reported that numerous citizens 
received threatening letters warning them to dismiss black laborers.  A public notice was also 
posted in Hickman: “To the Nigros of Hickman You are expected to Be absent May the 1st 
1908…We are the 800 mounted.  Well armed. Fare Warning.”
  Many of the men who directly depended on fishing income from Reelfoot Lake 
compromised and accommodated the shift to private ownership of the lake.  The night riders’ 
attacks, however, were not limited to men involved in commercial fishing. 
31  Although the editor assured 
readers that the threats were “tommy-rot” and there was “little or no danger of such threats being 
put into execution,” the night riders had caused considerable concern.32
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That night, the night riders gave Lake County even more to worry about.  A prominent 
citizen of Lake County, George Wynne, said publicly that Negroes were better than the night 
riders.  On April 24, the night riders crossed into Lake County and beat Wynne so severely that 
he died ten months later without ever recovering completely.33  In response, the Lake County 
Court offered a $1,000 reward for the arrest of anyone “threatening and intimidating the people” 
and “going about the county at night in disguise.”  A private group called the Law and Order 
League of Lake County Tennessee offered an additional $1,000 for the arrest of two or more of 
the night riders who maltreated their “best citizens,” on April 24.34
Between April and October, night riders attacked numerous people for petty violations of 
community standards.  For small offenses, the night riders typically whipped their victims, but 
occasionally they enacted punishments that sent deliberate messages to the community.  For 
instance, the night riders believed that John Shaw and J. C. Burdick had betrayed them.  When 
they burned Burdick’s dock, the night riders compelled Shaw and Burdick to betray each other 
by forcing Shaw to provide and carry the fuel that they used to destroy Burdick’s property.  
Similarly, when Harvey Fagan refused to work, the night riders harnessed him, forced him to 
plow a field, locked him in a stable with hay and corn, and then whipped him.
 
35
On May 21, officials in Lake County arrested four night riders when an African 
American man they abducted escaped and sought help.  The night riders intended to force the 
  The night riders 
literally forced Fagan to work like a mule.  Through these contrived attacks, the night riders 
embedded their accusations against their victims within the attack itself.  By describing the night 
riders’ crime to the community, victims indicted themselves.   
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black man to whip John Burnett, a local merchant.36
As the summer proceeded, the night riders warned and whipped a number of community 
members but conducted no major raids.  Although little evidence points to this type of violence 
against African Americans, officials and newspaper editors were uninterested in petty violence 
against blacks.  In the few news articles that recorded threats to African Americans, writers 
treated the incidents as amusing.  When The Hickman Courier reported that a local black man 
received a scare from night riders, the author noted, “He did not consider the whizzing of bullets 
especially good music.”
  Like the attacks on Burdick and Fagan, the 
thwarted attack on Burnett included a symbolic message.  Had the night riders succeeded, they 
would have forced a black man to injure a white merchant who was prospering from the cotton 
economy.  Obion’s struggling small farmers would have understood this message as an inversion 
of their own suffering at the hands of cotton merchants who profited from cheap black labor. 
37  When the night riders warned blacks to leave Hickman, the editor 
asserted that “law-abiding citizens [would] not tolerate” threats but jokingly invited the night 
riders to “help us get rid of the negro loafers who hang around the depot and some of the negro 
dives.”38  During the general violence and intimidation, night riders stopped a black man on the 
road, shot him through both arms, and ran him off.39
By August 10, 1908, Lake County citizens were sufficiently concerned about the night 
rider violence to seek help from outside the region.  Nineteen Lake County citizens and officials, 
including the sheriff of Lake County, the mayor of Tiptonville, and John Burnett (who had 
narrowly escaped a whipping himself) appealed to Governor Malcolm Rice Patterson for help.  
The petitioners emphasized the threats the night riders posed to their black labor force, not the 
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debate over fishing rights.  According to the petitioners, the night riders had “threatened and 
intimidated our citizens, none of whom had any interest whatever in the Reelfoot Lake 
controversy” and continued to threaten to come to Lake County and “destroy by fire the farm 
buildings of our citizens.”  The petitioners were anxious for the governor to send aid.  They 
wrote, “This county is a cotton raising County; our citizens depend almost entirely on negros for 
the labor to pick out their cotton, a great part of which labor is brought in from outside Counties 
and from other States; that the night riders mentioned above living in the Western portion of 
Obion County openly threat that they will come into this County when the cotton picking begins 
and drive every negro from our county.”40
Circuit Court Judge Joseph E. Jones and District Attorney D. J. Caldwell sent letters to 
Governor Patterson supporting the petitioners.  Caldwell confirmed that an “organized band” 
was “whipping respectable citizens of Lake County and threatening the Negroe [sic] laborers.”
   
41  
Jones wrote, “An extraordinary situation prevails in Lake County – and I would be glad that 
some aid be given… in accordance with their request.”42
Then, on the night of October 4, 1908, a group of night riders rode to African American 
farmer Dave Walker’s farm just across in the state line near Hickman, Kentucky and demanded 
that Walker come out.  When he refused, they set fire to the house.  As the family attempted to 
escape their burning home, the night riders shot them all.  Dave Walker, the only member of the 
family who was armed, was shot as he emerged from the house.  When his wife Annie ran into 
the yard, clutching her two-year-old infant, Ransey, the night riders killed them both.  Dave and 
  Governor Patterson took no action. 
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Annie’s sixteen-year-old daughter Susan was also killed.  Three other children were shot but 
survived the initial attack.  Reports indicated that their 14-year-old son, shot in the head and the 
abdomen, would die from his wounds.  The town of Hickman provided coffins, and white 
residents returned the Walker’s bodies to Tennessee for burial.  No one was arrested. 43
News reports indicated that the band attacked Dave Walker because he was a “bad negro” 
who had “recently” been accused of verbally abusing Joe Williams’ wife, but the events leading 
up to the massacre fail to support even this slim rationalization.  When the night riders attacked 
the Walker home at midnight, the shots roused Tom Bone, a white neighbor.  Bone thought that 
the Walkers were sending out a fire alarm and hurried to assist the family.  On the road, two 
night riders intercepted him and warned him to turn back.
   
44  In the event of an accidental late 
night fire, a black man with a poor reputation could hardly expect such a prompt response from a 
white neighbor.  Further, the incident between the Williams family and Dave Walker that 
purportedly provoked the night riders was resolved months before the attack.  At the beginning 
of June, Dave Walker paid a $10 fine and court costs for using abusive language in a dispute 
with Williams and his wife.45  Although Joe Williams went with the night riders to the Walker 
farm, he was not involved in planning the attack and did not want to go.  The night riders 
compelled him to accompany them.  Once there, he stayed back and held the horses.46
Likely, Dave Walker was not a “bad Negro,” but in the minds of the night riders, he was 
uppity.  Both Dave and Annie Walker could read and write.  They moved their family from 
  A court-
settled verbal altercation from June, which the offended white family was no longer pursuing, 
hardly explained the wholesale massacre of an entire family.   
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Tennessee to Kentucky sometime between 1890 and 1892.  By 1900, they owned their farm in 
Fulton County free and clear.  This placed them in a stronger economic position than many white 
farmers in their mixed race community.  Among their immediate neighbors, one black man and 
one white widow owned farms, while five white men farmed rented land.  At the time of his 
murder, Dave Walker owned six horses and mules, six head of cattle, 22 hogs, two wagons, a 
buggy, and the family’s farming equipment.  The community believed the Walkers were even 
more prosperous; after the massacre, a rumor circulated that $800 in cash burned inside the 
Walker home.47
In August, the prominent citizens of Lake County expressed concern that the night riders 
would attack and run off their black labor force during the height of cotton-picking season.  
Prosperous and frightened, Lake County offered $2,000 in rewards for the arrest and conviction 
of people involved in night riding, assembled posses, mounted patrols on the road that connected 
Obion and Lake Counties,
 
48 and threatened to use dynamite if night riders ventured into the 
community.49  In Tennessee, cotton harvest can fall anywhere between September and the end of 
November; in 1908, cotton picking fell in October.50  By October 31, picking and marketing 
were making rapid progress and Tennesseans had ginned over half of the year’s total crop.51
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county line to run off black laborers during cotton season.  Instead, they massacred a black 
family who dared to prosper. 
The ferocity of the Walker attack shocked even whites sympathetic to the night riders.  
An admitted night rider later suggested that the group “had not intended to go that far with the 
blacks” and that, after the Walker murders, even some members of the band questioned the night 
riders’ actions.52  Newspapers across the country and of every political leaning covered the 
attack, classifying it as a massacre, a slaughter, and mob rule.  One Kentucky paper blared, 
“Kentucky Weep! – For Your Children of Hell Have Broken Loose Again.  Wholesale Murder of 
Negro Family.”53  By October 15, The Hickman Courier had had enough and declared that the 
media had blown the Walker incident out of proportion.54  No arrests were made or expected in 
either Tennessee or Kentucky, although Governor Willson of Kentucky ordered troops to Fulton 
County, where Hickman was located, when “rumors that an outbreak on the part of the negroes 
… was imminent” alarmed county officials.55
The night riders’ attack on the Walkers was simple terrorism not community coercion.  In 
his analysis of whitecapping organizations in Mississippi, William Holmes argued that small 
farmers sought to dominate African Americans and drive black laborers out of the area through 
violence.
 
56
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Reelfoot Lake’s night riders murdered the Walkers, they were not protecting community values, 
they were lashing out in a grotesque display of violence meant to frighten and intimidate all 
African Americans. 
On October 19, Captain Rankin and Colonel Taylor traveled to Reelfoot Lake to meet 
Fred Carpenter, who was interested in leasing Grassy Island, a peninsula on Reelfoot Lake that 
the locals used as pasture.57  James Carpenter, a civil engineer, traveled from Paducah, Kentucky 
to meet Taylor and Rankin at Reelfoot Lake and run survey lines for the land they were planning 
to lease.  When the night riders went to Ward’s Hotel at Walnut Log, where Rankin and Taylor 
were staying, they searched the hotel for James Carpenter but could not find him.  James 
Carpenter had left a few hours earlier to spend the night with his mother, who lived near the lake, 
only four miles above Walnut Log.58
Governor Malcolm Patterson reacted swiftly, suspending his re-election campaign, 
announcing a $10,000 reward for Rankin’s murderers, and ordering three companies of troops to 
the area.
  By the morning of October 20, the night riders had hung 
Rankin, riddled his body with bullets and attempted to kill Taylor, who narrowly escaped by 
leaping into the lake and walking to Lake County.  Just four days earlier, former sheriff Finch 
had expressed confidence that the fishermen were satisfied with the commercial fishing 
arrangements at Reelfoot Lake.   
59
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Although other men confessed shortly after Fehringer, including several men who later 
testified on behalf of the state, local reaction to Fehringer’s confession transformed him from a 
leader among the night riders to an almost cartoonish villain.  When Paul Vanderwood 
interviewed former night riders Bud Morris, Joe Johnson, and Fred Pinion years later, their 
dislike of Fehringer remained surprisingly intense.  Johnson claimed that Frank Fehringer was a 
spy hired by Harris to infiltrate the night riders.  Morris named Fehringer as the leader of the 
attack on the Walkers.  Both Morris and Pinion accused Fehringer of selling out the band in 
exchange for the $10,000 state reward, even though no one, including Fehringer, ever claimed 
the reward.  In addition to being a traitor, a spy, and a greedy opportunist, the disdain for 
Fehringer among the former night riders led Vanderwood to classify him as “a criminal 
element,” “riffraff… with utterly no community standing” and a wanderer who had somehow 
snuck into a leadership position within the night riders. 60
Fehringer actually was a criminal, but he did not entirely conform to the night riders’ 
later depiction.  He ran whiskey along the lake and had been charged with bootlegging in Lake, 
Obion, and Fulton Counties.  The other night riders certainly knew of his crimes and he was not 
the only member of the group charged with crimes before or after 1908.
   
61  Fehringer was slight, 
mild-mannered, charming, and friendly.  If he was a wanderer, he had not gone far.  His father, 
Philip Fehringer, moved to Obion in 1874 and lived just above Samburg, on the Northern shore 
of the lake.  Philip Fehringer ran a fish business in Hickman, Kentucky where Frank attended 
school.62
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The night riders had nothing positive to say about Fehringer after 1908, but the man was 
likeable.  According to the prosecuting attorney in the night rider trials, “Frank Fehringer was an 
exhibitionist who enjoyed the limelight.”63  The state could not have hoped for a better witness.  
On the stand, Fehringer was composed, clear, and entertaining.  With his wide-brimmed hat 
balanced on the toe of his boot, Fehringer held his own for three hours of cross-examination, 
during which defense attorney Rice A. Pierce, an experienced lawyer and accomplished orator, 
unsuccessfully tried to provoke Fehringer into contradicting himself.  The defense could not even 
rattle Fehringer, who, when insulted, jabbed back with jokes and word play of his own.64
Frank Fehringer may have been a leader of the night riders, but he was not welcome 
around Reelfoot after the trial.  Although Fehringer charmed reporters and frustrated the defense, 
he fell apart after the trial ended.  In exchange for his testimony, Governor Patterson offered 
Fehringer immunity from prosecution, but Fehringer remained in state custody for his own 
protection during the trials.  In January of 1909, while held in protective custody at a Weakley 
County jail, a despondent Fehringer attempted suicide by taking bichloride of mercury.  In soap 
opera fashion, Frances Campbell, a woman Fehringer had known during his schooldays in 
Hickman, heard of his attempted suicide and traveled from Nashville to Weakley County to 
comfort him.  Frances and Frank Fehringer were wed in the Weakley County jail on January 20, 
1909.
  
Although other former night riders testified, none matched Fehringer’s performance on the 
witness stand. 
65
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  This bizarre fairytale soon fell apart.  Later that year, a Hamilton County jury convicted 
Fehringer of attempting to murder his new bride.  In jail during November of 1910, Fehringer 
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again attempted to kill himself.66  Given the animosity that former night riders retained for 
Fehringer decades after the trial, it was safest that he never returned to Reelfoot Lake.  Bud 
Morris and Fred Pinion thought he had moved to St. Louis, Missouri.67
Fehringer’s performance on the witness stand and his subsequent personal collapse likely 
contributed to the other night rider’s characterization of his prominence in the band as somewhat 
inexplicable, but the men did not rely entirely on captains like Fehringer for their leadership.  
Garrett Johnson, who was involved in the organization of the Reelfoot group, and a leader 
throughout 1908, was a widely respected farmer.  During Johnson’s trial, a reverend and a justice 
of the peace testified to his character, although both admitted under cross-examination that, since 
the violence began, rumors held that Johnson was a leader of the night riders.
 
68  Other local 
officials and moral leaders supported the night riders as well.  Sheriff T. J. Easterwood took no 
action following the night riders’ crimes.69  The deputy sheriff in the Reelfoot area, William A. 
Mayo, became a night rider himself.70  According to night riders Fred Pinion and Bud Morris, 
notable men would not participate in night rider raids, but they encouraged and supported the 
group by speaking at night rider rallies.71
Night rider Ed Marshall, who testified that the band threatened to harm his wife and child 
if he did not join, was “probably the most prominent and affluent of the suspects.”
   
72
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  Marshall’s 
brother, Richard Marshall, a Baptist minister, returned to Reelfoot to post bond for his brother 
and remained to implement a moral campaign on behalf of the prisoners.  Reverend Marshall 
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prosecution of the night riders as a gross over-reaching of state power.  According to Reverend 
Marshall, “The strong arm of the Governor rushed in and gathered up the sons of toil” and held 
them without bond despite the fact that “fewer depravations, fewer invasions of law and virtue” 
had occurred in the area around Reelfoot “than perhaps in any other section of Tennessee.”  In 
his appeal for the men accused as night riders, Reverend Marshall declared, “I deplore the death 
of Captain Rankin, but perhaps the State will not know for some time to come the gross injustice 
perpetrated upon the citizens of the lake region, which I do not give as an excuse for murder, but 
as explanation of animosity.”73
When the night rider cases proceeded to trial, the accused men hired former U.S. 
Congressman and agrarian reformer Rice A. Pierce to represent them.  They could not have 
hoped for a more dedicated or appropriate defender.  The night riders trusted him completely.
  Reverend Marshall may not have excused murder from the 
pulpit, but parishioners could certainly leave believing that Rankin had it coming. 
74  
Despite Pierce’s “flamboyant courtroom demeanor” and widespread public sympathy, the jury 
convicted eight men.75
During the investigation and prosecution of the night riders, the connection between the 
men accused of night riding and cotton cultivation became clear.  One of the suspects, John 
Ratliff, owned a nearby general store.  Ratliff unsuccessfully appealed to be released on bail 
  Judge Joseph E. Jones sentenced six of the convicted to death by 
hanging.  In 1909, the Tennessee Supreme Court overturned the convictions due to a number of 
legal errors committed by the prosecution during the intense state investigation and prosecution.  
The state never conducted new trials.  Patterson’s zealous investigation quelled the violence at 
Reelfoot Lake, but no one served time for Rankin’s murder. 
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before “local farmers sold their cotton crops and spent their proceeds elsewhere,” ruining his 
business.76  Della Frog, a 16-year-old woman from the Reelfoot area, testified that, on the day 
Rankin was murdered, she and accused night rider Hirschell Hogg spent the day picking 
cotton.77  Hirschell Hogg argued that he could not have been involved in Captain Rankin’s 
murder because he had traveled to Troy to deposit cotton in the Farmers’ Union warehouse on 
the morning of October 20.  In response, the state produced receipts to demonstrate that Hogg 
deposited the cotton on October 21, leaving Hogg time to be at Rankin’s murder and still get to 
the Farmers’ Union warehouse.78
Hogg’s connection to the Farmers’ Union demonstrates that the farmers around Reelfoot 
Lake remained aware of and connected to the ongoing agrarian reform movement.  Emerging 
after the political collapse of the Populist movement, the Farmers’ Union was popular with men 
who had previously supported the Alliance and other agrarian reform efforts.  The Farmers’ 
Union learned from the collapse of earlier organizations and aimed to survive by providing 
members with recognizable material benefits.
   
79  To ensure that farmers profited from 
participation, the Farmers’ Union promoted modern business practices, “practical and visionary 
goals” and “sought both professionalism of agriculture and rural uplift.”80
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succeeded in establishing a lower limit on cotton prices through acreage reductions, crop 
withholding, and a system of warehouses like the one in Troy.  John H. McDowell, Obion 
77 “Women on Stand in Union City,” The Atlanta Constitution, December 31, 1908, 5. 
78 “Juror Taken Suddenly Ill,” The Atlanta Constitution, January 4, 1909, 2. 
79 Commodore B. Fisher, The Farmers’ Union (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1920), 9.  
80 Lester, 209. 
 80 
County’s outspoken Populist reformer, served as President of the Obion County Union and was a 
delegate to the 1909 Farmers’ Union National Convention.81
Throughout the trials, accounts of the night riders’ prosecution shared newspaper space 
with public outcries against the hated trusts and monopolies.  Between 1907 and 1909, the 
Standard Oil case wound through the court system; the editors at The Hickman Courier left no 
doubt about their opinion of the corporation.  When the court reversed the fine assessed against 
Standard Oil in 1908, the editor declared, “The Standard Oil Company, like most of the big 
corporations, has squirmed out of paying.”  The editor lamented the failure of justice to 
overcome bureaucratic restrictions and hold corporations responsible.
 
82  During the summer of 
1908, the editors complained that Republican politicians refused to intervene against 
corporations like Standard Oil, which were acting with impunity.  With the presidential election 
approaching, the editors predicted that Republicans would suffer for failing to act.83  In 1908, 
both William Jennings Bryan and Howard Taft ran on platforms promising to address the 
problem of monopolies and trusts.  Standard Oil became an issue in the presidential campaign 
when William R. Hearst published letters revealing an inappropriate relationship between 
Standard Oil and Democratic Party Treasurer, Governor Haskell of Oklahoma.84  In Hickman, 
the editors held Bryan blameless but made no allowances for Standard Oil, arguing that both 
Bryan and Taft were “entirely free from any taint of slime that may have been left in the trail of 
the corrupting trusts.”85
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The night riders convinced the local representatives of the land company to withdraw in 
April.  Consequentially, the night riders benefited from the national sentiment against distant 
monopolies and trusts during the trial.  Although reporters often portrayed the night riders as 
simple, uncivilized ruffians, they were nonetheless oppressed ruffians who had responded to 
monopolistic control in the only way they understood.  In a letter to the editor, a resident of Long 
Beach, California provided his interpretation of the murder of Captain Rankin.  According to the 
writer, “In the closing days of struggle for office… an incident illustrative of the methods by 
which the lands and waters of our locality are being rapidly monopolized as they are now in 
Great Britain” had occurred at Reelfoot Lake.  Previously, the lake was “free for hunting and 
fishing.  Now, owing to the efforts of the lawyers of the class which formed the great trusts of 
our country, it has become a private preserve for a few moneyed men.”  The writer concluded 
that, although one man was already dead, the state “will hang a few more of the mudsills of 
society” before the tragedy ended.86  In December of 1908, the West Tennessee Land Company 
affirmed the public sentiment that placed it in the fraternity of oppressive national corporations; 
the company leased thousands of acres of Reelfoot Lake to Standard Oil.87
Although the narrative of the West Tennessee Land Company played out in the public 
arena as a battle between a distant, powerful monopoly and oppressed locals, it did not begin that 
way.  Locals Shaw and Pleasant were forced out of the land company by coercive violence.  The 
same tactics had worked before.  During the late nineteenth century, Obion’s small landholders 
were able to exert social pressure in reaction to unpopular decisions by local elites.  When Mr. 
Wilson attempted to profit by leasing commercial rights to the lake during the 1860s, local 
pressure not only convinced him to acquiesce, it converted him to a permanent advocate for 
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public control of the lake.  During the 1909 state investigation into the acquisition of Reelfoot 
Lake, Mr. Wilson asserted that title to the land did not provide control of the lake.  The West 
Tennessee Land Company asked $75,000 to surrender its titles to the state of Tennessee, a price 
that Wilson and others found exorbitant.  At the time, Wilson still held title to 5,000 acres in the 
area, which he offered to the state for $450, adding that he would gift the land to the state for the 
public good if they could not pay.  His offer undercut the West Tennessee Land Company’s 
position and the high valuation that the company placed on its property at Reelfoot.88
In 1908, community coercion remained an effective tool against locals like Shaw, 
Pleasant, and Burdick, but wealth and power placed Judge Harris beyond the reach of disgruntled 
locals.  Harris was neither faceless nor distant, but by 1908, he was infuriatingly untouchable.  
J. C. Harris had left his son landholdings so extensive that when he died in 1910, Judge Harris 
was the richest man in the state.  Harris lived just across the lake but in a veritable fortress that, 
rumor held, he had surrounded with electrically detonating explosives.  Harris’ vast wealth 
bought him the allegiance of many Lake County residents.  Shaw, Pleasant, Rankin, and Taylor 
believed that the lawyers were insulated from community attacks, but when Rankin and Taylor 
traveled to Reelfoot Lake they became accessible surrogates for the night riders’ anger at Harris.  
In his own account of his ordeal, Taylor reported, “The leader of the mob talked with us, telling 
us we were associated too much with Judge Harris and were taking entirely too much interest in 
the lake.”
 
89
Although the attacks against Shaw, Pleasant, and Burdick and the murder of Rankin 
generated widespread interest, the night riders’ targeted a host of related agricultural and land 
   
                                                 
88 Cecil Humphreys, “The Formation of Reelfoot Lake and Consequent Land and Social Problems,” West 
Tennessee Historical Society Papers 14 (1960): 47; Vanderwood, 130. 
89 “Col. Taylor is Unharmed,” Owingsville Outlook (KY), October 29, 1908, 2. 
 83 
pressures through their crimes.  When the land company signed the lease that Taylor and Rankin 
traveled to Reelfoot to finalize, farmers stood to lose open range forage lands, an essential 
element of their precarious economic independence.90
The night riders responded with violence that was informed by earlier agrarian uprisings 
and the changing agricultural conditions that had transformed their region.  During the state 
investigation, the night riders’ bylaws and constitution became public.  In addition to demanding 
that no black tenants remain in the area after July of 1909 under penalty of death, the documents 
proposed to fix interest rates at 6 percent; regulate the profit of merchant’s goods at 10 percent; 
establish fixed prices for cotton, corn, and other farm produce; establish fixed wages for farm 
labor; and limit land ownership to 500 acres.
  Judge Harris ruled a cotton empire 
governed by tenancy and the primacy of private property rights.  For Obion County’s small 
farmers, their economic independence depended on an increasingly precarious patchwork of 
cotton, tobacco, and common land rights.  For these farmers, Reelfoot Lake provided a natural 
buffer between themselves and Lake County’s merchants and landlords.  When the West 
Tennessee Land Company imposed restrictions on the use of Reelfoot Lake, the natural barrier 
that had separated Obion’s white smallholders from Judge Harris’ cotton empire threatened to 
disappear. 
91  These demands reveal the ideological 
underpinnings of the Reelfoot uprising and the host of agricultural issues that informed the night 
riders’ crimes.  William Holmes argued that, “the racist and nativist elements of the farm 
organizations tacked on to these laudable goals [of agrarian improvements through cooperation], 
a steadfast determination to control the Negro.”92
                                                 
90 Vanderwood, 14. 
  Reelfoot’s night riders retained Populism’s 
91 “Night Riders Ringleader,” Hopkinsville Kentuckian, October 31, 1908, 4. 
92 Holmes, “Whitecapping,” 165. 
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impulse for economic reform but expunged the ideal of racial cooperation that had troubled the 
People’s Party in the South.   
The night riders initiated two concurrent strains of violence when the West Tennessee 
Land Company exerted control over Reelfoot Lake, which had previously acted as a buffer 
between Lake and Obion Counties.  The night riders’ restrained, traditional attacks against Shaw, 
Burdick, and Pleasant aimed to reassert community values through intimidation.  They 
succeeded in driving Shaw and Pleasant out of the land company, leaving it in the hands of 
Harris and the attorneys, and providing the foundation for the depiction of the land company as 
an exploitative imposition on the bewildered residents of Reelfoot Lake.  The night riders 
targeted attacks against the men involved in the West Tennessee Land Company, but their 
violence against African Americans was neither restrained nor traditional.  The night riders did 
not seek to alter the behavior of specific African Americans; they wanted to remove all black 
labor from the region.  For much of their campaign, the night riders’ adopted different forms of 
violence depending on the race of their victim, but night rider crimes against people of both races 
indicate an interest in the mechanisms of the cotton economy rather than issues directly related to 
the lake.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICAL LESSON OF RURAL REVOLT 
Malcolm Rice Patterson was no wild-eyed agrarian reformer.  The son of Confederate 
Colonel and U.S. Congressman Josiah Patterson, Malcolm Patterson was educated at Vanderbilt 
University and practiced law before being elected Attorney General for Shelby County.  In 1900, 
Patterson won election in the tenth congressional district, replacing Edward Ward Carmack, who 
had recently secured election to the U.S. Senate.  Malcolm Patterson had aristocratic roots, but 
he knew more than most politicians that he needed agrarian votes.  For months, Patterson chose 
not to intervene in the violence around Reelfoot Lake.  As long as the night riders constrained 
their attacks against whites to traditional community coercion and focused their unrestrained, 
vicious attacks on African Americans, the governor felt no need to risk alienating supporters on 
either side of the issue.  When the night riders subjected two prominent white men to the type of 
violence usually reserved for blacks, Patterson responded immediately.  Even after Rankin’s 
death, a conflict between large cotton landlords and economically-pressed small farmers 
presented Patterson with a significant political risk.  Fortunately for Patterson, most of the night 
rider crimes directly tied to the expanding cotton economy targeted African Americans.  
Politically, Governor Patterson could not afford to appear insensitive to the agricultural and 
economic concerns of Tennessee’s small farmers, but he could comfortably ignore the plight of 
African Americans.   
Malcolm Rice Patterson learned from the political career of his father that, in Tennessee, 
politicians who discounted agricultural concerns risked losing elections.  In 1896, Josiah 
Patterson lost his Congressional seat in the tenth district to Edward Ward Carmack.  Although 
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vocally opposed to the Populist movement, Carmack welcomed disaffected Democrats back into 
the fold when the party embraced free silver as a panacea for the farmers’ complaints.  Josiah 
Patterson, however, firmly advocated the gold standard.1  As Patterson explained to his 
constituents, his position placed him at odds with the party leadership in the state, including both 
sitting Senators, but despite party pressure and the prevailing political wind, Patterson refused to 
move.  Cotton tied him to the gold standard.  As Patterson explained to the voters he represented, 
“You are all dependent for your money on cotton…Sixty-eight per cent, or 68 out of every 100 
pounds of cotton produced in the Southern States is shipped abroad and sold in foreign 
countries.”2
While most Tennessee Democrats offered free silver as a palliative against agrarian 
unrest, Patterson simply dismissed farmers’ complaints.  Josiah Patterson was not merely 
resistant to free silver, he was confident that Populism had no place in his district.  He wrote, 
“Notwithstanding all you have heard from the mouths of Populist orators about the Southern 
people being oppressed with debt, it is not true.  The fact is that the South when compared with 
the balance of the country is practically out of debt.”
  Patterson believed that, while the United States could sufficiently subsidize silver in 
order to maintain the exchange rate between silver and gold within the U.S., the imbalance 
between the exchange rate for gold and silver on the world market would place cotton producers 
at a disadvantage when trading with countries that maintained a single gold standard.   
3
                                                 
1 Clyde J. Faries, “Carmack Versus Patterson: The Genesis of a Political Feud,” Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly 38, no. 3 (Fall 1979): 332-347. 
  Patterson knew his district, but the 
agrarian message of reform resonated with voters, particularly when voters could adopt aspects 
of the reform platform without deserting the Democratic Party.  The race was close, but 
2 Josiah Patterson, Open Letter from Hon. Josiah Patterson to His Constituents (Washington: Hartman & 
Cadick, 1894), 17. 
3 Josiah Patterson, 17. 
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Patterson misjudged the strength of agrarian rhetoric.  Carmack won.  Josiah Patterson’s son 
would not repeat his mistake. 
Malcolm Rice Patterson represented the same district as his father, but he navigated the 
political currents more adeptly.  Josiah Patterson had dismissed the frustrations of disaffected 
farmers as illegitimate and ultimately detrimental to the cotton market; Malcolm Patterson linked 
popular political complaints directly to the cotton crop.  Malcolm Patterson proposed cotton 
markets as an agricultural barometer for the entire nation, arguing, “what is true of them will be 
true of all other agricultural interests in the country.”4  He believed that trusts and tariffs 
unreasonably disadvantaged cotton growers, driving down the cost of cotton and forcing young 
men away from the “quiet pursuits of agriculture” into cities, which he thought was a particularly 
unfortunate outcome because “the strongest ties which bind a citizen to his country are found in 
ownership of the soil.”5  Beneath the rising arch of Progressive rhetoric lambasting trusts, 
Patterson framed agricultural production as essential for national identity and the cotton market 
as a bellwether for all agricultural production, arguing that trusts and tariffs which disadvantaged 
cotton producers were “opposed to and subversive of republican government.”6  For Patterson, 
this framework was enduring.  In 1903, Patterson wrote, “The cotton crop of the South is its 
great money crop… and will be for many years to come.”7
                                                 
4 Malcolm R. Patterson, Trust Problem Causes and Power of Allied Wealth: Speech of Hon. Malcolm R. 
Patterson of Tennessee, in the House of Representatives, Thursday, January 29, 1903 (Washington DC: n.p., 1903), 
7. 
  He called trusts, combinations, and 
monopolies Frankenstein’s monsters whose “dread and sinister influence” demanded immediate 
5 Malcolm R. Patterson, Trust, 6. 
6 Malcolm R. Patterson, Trust, 4.  
7 Malcolm R. Patterson, Trust, 8. 
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action.8  Patterson responded to critics who accused him of pursuing reform at the expense of 
states’ rights, by saying, “I believe in State sovereignty, but I do not want State sovereignty 
prostituted to the base uses of the trusts.”9
In 1905, within two weeks of longtime Senator William Bate’s death in office, the 
Democratic State Executive Committee nominated and the state legislature elected Governor 
Frazier to succeed Bate in the Senate.  John Isaac Cox, a close associate of Frazier, gained the 
governorship.  The rapid election drew criticism from Robert Love Taylor, who alleged that the 
state Democratic machine held a snap caucus to prevent candidates from challenging the 
governor’s nomination.  Campaigning on the issue of the snap caucus, Robert L. Taylor 
challenged Edward Ward Carmack, a close associate of both Cox and Frazier, for his senate seat.  
Taylor successfully exploited the snap caucus, dividing Democrats across the state and leading 
the State Democratic Executive Committee to set the first primary for determining a senatorial 
nominee.  Although the party convention still selected the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, 
the snap caucus eroded Governor Cox’s support.  Malcolm Rice Patterson’s supporters gained 
control of the convention and secured the nomination for Patterson.  After difficult fights to 
secure their nominations, Taylor and Patterson went on to win their respective offices.  Both men 
boasted political pedigrees, but they owed their offices to the divisions that erupted within the 
party when Robert L. Taylor launched a frontal assault on the existing Democratic coalition.
 
10
Robert L. Taylor had remained a popular political figure since he joked and fiddled his 
way to victory against his own brother during the 1886 gubernatorial election.  As late 
 
                                                 
8 Malcolm R. Patterson, Trust, 23. 
9 Malcolm R. Patterson, Trust, 21.  
10 William R. Majors, Change and Continuity: Tennessee Politics Since the Civil War (Macon: Mercer, 
1986), 40-41. 
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nineteenth-century agrarian rumblings rose to a roar, disaffected farmers embraced aspects of 
agrarian reform, but no southeastern state embraced all aspects of the official 1896 Populist Party 
Platform.  In Tennessee and across the Southeast, Populism’s appeal to voters rested on specific 
issues within the platform that appealed to discontented voters who were more interested in 
gaining a political voice than in mounting an insurrection against existing political parties.  After 
Robert L. Taylor’s term as governor, Tennessee, along with three other southern states, “softened 
the Alliance’s insistence on radical solutions by nominating for governor men who had ties to the 
movement but who opposed the St. Louis platform.”11
When Taylor defeated Carmack in the 1906 senatorial primary by a scant 7,000 votes, he 
won by carrying the urban vote, but he had consistently recruited disaffected rural whites.  
Although historians may see the Populists’ acceptance of William Jennings Bryan as the 
deathblow to Populism, in Tennessee at the turn of the twentieth century all but a handful of 
purist reformers regarded Bryan as their champion.  Taylor repeatedly referenced Bryan when 
wooing rural voters.  He reminded voters that Carmack had not always been as committed to 
their interests as he now seemed.  During the senatorial primary, Taylor chastised Carmack 
saying, “After you were through clubbing the populists and the gold wing of your party… you 
  Even during the height of the agrarian 
reform movement, Tennessee’s voters were far more committed to individual reforms than to the 
formation of an alternative political party.  Robert L. Taylor’s strength lay in his ability to speak 
to these disaffected voters from within the Democratic ranks.  For voters who wanted a voice in 
politics, “Our Bob” seemed to offer evidence that the old party could adapt to the concerns of the 
common people.   
                                                 
11 Robert C. McMath, American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898, ed. Eric Foner (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1993), 130. 
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left your seat in the United States Senate and went to St. Louis, and there… you assaulted with 
scorching tongue your friend and benefactor, the great leader of your party and the idol of the 
common people, William Jennings Bryan.”12
Malcolm Patterson tied his primary campaign to Taylor’s critique of the snap caucus, 
attempted to appropriate Taylor’s rural appeal, and stressed his own reform credentials.  In 
announcing his candidacy for governor, Patterson lambasted trusts, the perennial theme of 
agrarian reform: “I have opposed unlawful combinations of wealth and the concentrated power 
of the great industrial trusts which have preyed upon the people.”
  
13  Taylor and Patterson’s 
oblique appeals created sufficient links between Patterson’s campaign and earlier agrarian 
reformers that committed Populist John H. McDowell felt it necessary to announce publicly that 
he did not support Patterson’s 1906 campaign.14
When Robert L. Taylor exploited the snap caucus to create a rift in the Democratic Party, 
Patterson successfully joined enough factions to secure the governorship.  Patterson’s personal 
collection of clippings from the election of 1906 reveals how well he understood the precarious 
nature of his own position.  One author editorialized that Patterson’s nomination posed “the 
greatest disciplinary test [the Democratic Party] has had in Tennessee since the war.”  The writer 
reflected, “It is a pity that his winning is chargeable to factionalism and not to a straight party 
fight, because he may not be able to unify the elements and harmonize a strong fighting 
 
                                                 
12 “Exchange Between Taylor and Carmack,” undated, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, Accession No. 
1157, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
13 Opening Speech of M. R. Patterson, Democratic Candidate for Governor, made October 5, 1905 at the 
Vendome Theater, Nashville, Tennessee, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee State Library 
and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
14 Untitled news clipping, 1906, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee State Library 
and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
 91 
 
democracy.”15
The high standards that Malcolm Patterson espoused were, in Patterson’s view, not only 
limited to white voters but also attainable only by an electorate comprised entirely of white 
voters.  During their 1906 campaigns, both Bob Taylor and Malcolm Patterson targeted only 
white voters.  For instance, Bob Taylor shared Malcolm Patterson’s faith in the cotton markets.  
Taylor believed world demand for cotton would soar, and white men needed to hold the color 
line and plan to replace black workers who abandoned agricultural labor for cities.
  The core issue of Malcolm Patterson’s campaign was the restoration of high 
political standards through the deconstruction and reform of Tennessee’s corrupt Democratic 
political machine. 
16  Patterson 
explicitly called for sectional reconciliation among white men at the expense of African 
Americans.  While still in Congress, Patterson said, “It was not the war that kept sectional 
antagonism alive so long …but it was universal negro suffrage which provoked a misguided 
northern feeling and ate its way like a corroding canker to the very heart of the southern 
people.”17  Patterson characterized the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as mistakes and 
crimes, even saying, “the fifteenth amendment…chained the South to a corpse.”18
                                                 
15 “MR Patterson and the Campaign of 1906,” undated news clipping from The Chattanooga Times, 
Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
  He admitted 
that southern whites might have “resort[ed] to questionable measures” to escape the threat of 
Negro rule, but portrayed the outcome as unquestionably positive.  Patterson believed that, since 
the Civil War, “there [had] been another – a moral – and a greater victory, when the South 
16 “Speech Delivered at the Tabernacle in Nashville, Tennessee by Ex-Gov. Robt. L. Taylor, Candidate for 
United States Senator,” May 12,1906, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee State Library and 
Archives, Nashville, TN. 
17 Excerpt, Congressional Record - House, undated, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, 
Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
18 “Old Guard in Gray,” undated news clipping, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee 
State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN.  
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asserted, and despite envy and passion, fixed secure forever the right and power and necessity of 
the white man to rule the land of his birth.”19  Southern men had secured white supremacy in the 
South and Patterson exhorted young white men to “take a decent and a healthy interest in 
politics” so that victory would be protected.20
The district that both Josiah and Malcolm Patterson represented, the Tenth Congressional 
District, experienced some of the worst electoral abuses in the state during the 1888 Democratic 
push to gain control of state politics.  The Democratic representatives elected through that fraud 
helped enact changes to election law that strengthened the Democratic Party’s grasp on statewide 
politics, but stalwartly Republican East Tennessee ensured that the Democrats remained 
vulnerable.  In the initial vote count for the 1894 gubernatorial election, lackluster Democratic 
candidate Peter Turney lost the hotly contested election to Republican Henry Clay Evans by 748 
votes.  Although the Populist candidate, A. L. Mims, won only 10 percent of the overall vote, 
even such a slim percentage dwarfed the narrow margin of victory.  The Democrats rallied, 
launching a legislative investigation that reversed the outcome and declared Turney the winner 
by 2,354 votes.
 
21
Between the Democrats’ quelling of the agrarians during the 1896 election and Malcolm 
Patterson’s assault on machine politics in 1906, gubernatorial elections had been relatively 
routine.  Patterson understood that the nature of his nomination placed him in a dangerous 
  The Democrats successfully reasserted control of the electoral process, but the 
election of 1894 demonstrated that, even under the new election laws, Republicans retained 
sufficient power to exploit divisions and challenge Democratic control.   
                                                 
19 “Elk’s Memorial Service at Chattanooga,” undated speech, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 
1157, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
20 “Patterson’s Speech,” undated news clipping, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee 
State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN.  
21 Connie Lester, Up From the Mudsills of Hell, (Athens: University of Georgia, 2006), 199-201. 
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position.  His father had learned the peril of ignoring disaffected agrarian voters.  By exploiting 
party conflict to seize the gubernatorial nomination, Patterson exacerbated the party divisions 
that Democrats feared Republican candidates would exploit.  In Tennessee, the Democratic Party 
was not unassailable.  Patterson had reason to believe that he needed help gathering an effective 
coalition to win and maintain the governorship. 
Throughout his political career, Malcolm Patterson collected news clippings, mostly 
about himself.  The vast majority of his clippings from the election of 1906 are pieces about 
himself or Bob Taylor, but among these mementoes, Patterson carefully saved an article called 
“Georgia Populists.”  The article explained that Tom Watson and the Georgia Populists were 
going to save Democrat Hoke Smith.  The Populists had “decided that, while the democratic 
party was about the vilest thing that ever happened and the rules adopted by the state committee 
were ‘damnable,’ yet the welfare of Jeffersonian democracy demanded that on this occasion the 
populists should submit.”22
Malcolm Patterson was not a Populist, but he could hardly afford to offend voters with a 
proven record of voting on behalf of reform, and he was not above pandering to a demographic 
group if it would pay off at the ballot box.  As C. Vann Woodward noted, “The picture of the 
Georgia Populist and the reformed Georgia conservative united on a platform of Negrophobia 
and progressivism was strikingly symbolical of the new era in the South.”
   
23
                                                 
22 “Georgia Populists,” undated news clipping, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, Tennessee 
State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
  In Patterson’s 
personal record of the election, he saved an article detailing the conditions and the strategy under 
which Georgia Populists consented to boost Democratic progressive Hoke Smith into the 
23 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 90. 
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governorship.  Malcolm Patterson was no agrarian reformer, but he knew an effective strategy 
when he saw one.   
When Patterson defeated his Republican opponent in 1906, he admitted, “My election to 
the office of Governor was not the peaceful result of undivided public sentiment, but rather the 
culmination of the storm and unrest of divergent and hostile political forces.”  Nonetheless, 
Patterson pledged, “to deserve; if I do not have, the support of every man who sincerely 
wishes… higher political standards.”24
During his opening message to Tennessee’s General Assembly in 1907, Patterson chided 
the legislature to address several issues that risked diminishing Tennessee’s esteem among other 
states.  Tennessee had no executive mansion.  In the face of limited appropriations and deferred 
maintenance, the Capitol had fallen into disrepair, and the state militia was underfunded.  
Patterson requested immediate action to restore the structures of state power, expand the militia, 
and extend the governor’s control over the state militia in order to prevent these aspects of state 
government from becoming an insult to Tennessee.
  For Patterson, like many Progressive reformers in the 
South, efficient reform and the attainment of high political standards required the 
disfranchisement of African Americans.  Having achieved election by lambasting the corruption 
of machine politics, Patterson turned his attention to righting the wrongs he perceived in other 
aspects of state government.  
25
Patterson also outlined the wide swath of Progressive reforms that formed the foundation 
of his political agenda.  He suggested replacing the existing system of school directors with 
   
                                                 
24 “M.R. Patterson is Governor,” undated news clipping, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 1157, 
Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN.  
25 Malcolm R. Patterson, Message of Governor Malcolm R. Patterson to the Fifty-Fifth General Assembly, 
State of Tennessee, 1907 (Nashville: Ambrose & Bostelman Co, 1907), Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. No. 
1157, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN, 3-4. 
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county school boards “as the first progressive step to educational reform.”26  He wanted to 
replace the existing road overseer with a Good Roads Commission.  The governor requested that 
the General Assembly support or appropriate funds for laws addressing pure food and drugs, 
election reform, fire and life insurance, labor reform, juvenile detention, and prison reform.  
Patterson believed agriculture would “always be [the state’s] chief dependence,” but this belief 
did not justify a nostalgic appreciation for traditional practices.27
Among the long list of scientific, progressive reforms Patterson advocated during his first 
message to the General Assembly, he also pushed for the enactment of laws focused on 
conservation and the establishment of state forest preserves.  In 1906, Patterson wrote to Gifford 
Pinchot to inquire about the establishment of state forest reserves.  The new governor provided 
the General Assembly with a copy of Pinchot’s reply.  Pinchot wrote, “I am very glad that you 
intend to take up this important question as Governor of the State of Tennessee.”
  To support the development of 
Tennessee’s agricultural resources, Patterson recommended legislation supporting scientific 
agriculture, the creation of farmers’ institutes, and the establishment of agricultural experiment 
stations in each of Tennessee’s grand divisions. 
28
                                                 
26 Malcolm R. Patterson, Message to the Fifty-Fifth Assembly, 7. 
  In accord 
with Pinchot’s suggestions, Patterson requested an appropriation from the General Assembly to 
fund a study of forest conditions in the state, but he was interested in preserving more than 
timber production.  The new governor emphasized the need for speedy enactment of laws that 
would protect game across the entire state and prevent the pollution of streams, along with 
general conservation legislation.  Patterson requested “some initial legislation that may arouse 
public sentiment to the danger which threatens a complete forest denudation, and the necessity of 
27 Malcolm R. Patterson, Message to the Fifty-Fifth Assembly, 4-5. 
28 Malcolm R. Patterson, Message to the Fifty-Fifth Assembly, 10. 
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a system of re-foresting and the proper care and preservation of our trees.”  The governor 
reasoned, “The streams, forests and game are given to us in trust, not for our present selfish use 
alone, but for rational enjoyment now and for future preservation.”29
Patterson’s laundry list of proposed Progressive reforms was ambitious enough on its 
own, but the new governor also had to navigate issues that pre-dated his election, including the 
tobacco night riding associated with the Planters’ Protective Association.  On the Paducah side 
of the Black Patch, Kentucky’s Republican governor, Augustus Willson, responded to the 
violence in the region with a combination of impotence and fury.  Although Willson avoided 
disparaging the tobacco growers during his election campaign, critics accused him of an apparent 
lack of sympathy for farmers generally and tobacco growers specifically when he reached office.  
Willson blamed farmers’ inability to understand the laws of supply and demand for the plight 
facing growers.  When Willson attempted to broker a meeting between the factions in the 
tobacco dispute, both major players, Felix Ewing of the PPA and James B. Duke of the 
American Tobacco Company, declined to attend.  Willson vetoed legislation prohibiting growers 
from reneging on cooperative agreements.  When the bill passed despite his veto, he pardoned 
growers who broke their contracts.  As tobacco night riders destroyed personal property and 
burned warehouses, a blustery Willson called out the state militia, but the troops perpetually 
  To Patterson, the need for 
state intervention was clear, not only to ensure the rational preservation of natural resources but 
also to arouse public interest in a statewide problem about which neither the government nor the 
people had expressed proper concern.   
                                                 
29 Malcolm R. Patterson, Message to the Fifty-Fifth Assembly, 10. 
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arrived in the wrong place at the wrong time while tobacco warehouses smoldered elsewhere.  
None of Willson’s efforts curtailed the violence.30
Patterson’s approach was decidedly more sympathetic to the PPA.  In fact, Patterson 
believed that cotton growers, always the centerpiece of agricultural production in his mind, could 
benefit from the PPA’s example.  Speaking to over 1,500 farmers at an agricultural institute in 
Nashville, Patterson emphasized the enormous value of the South’s cotton crop.  In light of this 
rich resource, Patterson told the farmers, “I believe the cotton planters could form an 
organization such as that of the dark tobacco growers and get living prices.  The tobacco 
association is an object lesson to the world for it has forced the trust to pay living wages.”
 
31  
Despite his positive assessment of the PPA, on August 15, 1907, Patterson issued a proclamation 
offering two monetary rewards for the arrest and conviction of night riders responsible for 
burning a tobacco warehouse.  Although Patterson called the acts of arson “high-handed 
outrages” and offered a vague threat of further state intervention, he specifically limited his 
interest in the matter to “further depredations upon property.”32  Patterson took no additional 
action and the monetary rewards remained unclaimed.33
Patterson’s support of the PPA and his unimpassioned response to tobacco night riding 
revealed his willingness to tolerate extralegal coercion and violence, as long that violence fell 
within prescribed racial boundaries and supported a goal that he believed was just.  Patterson 
acknowledged that southern men resorted to “questionable measures” in disfranchising African 
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Americans, but through those questionable acts voters inherited “a great trust… to keep the 
liberty we have inaugurated pure and untarnished and undefiled and to hand that liberty down to 
our posterity as we inherited it.”34  For Patterson, abuses against African Americans were not the 
result of lawlessness but of “the monstrous wrong against civilization and the dominant race” 
that occurred when the North “’clothed [the Negro] with political rights.”35
Christopher Waldrep distinguished between the PPA’s aristocratic leadership and the 
lower-class whites who comprised the organization’s enforcement arm, but early twentieth-
century observers drew the class divisions within the PPA differently.  In 1910, the Journal of 
Political Economy published an article exploring the conditions in the Black Patch and Burley 
tobacco regions.  The writer characterized Felix Ewing as a classic paternalist, a gentleman with 
the means, ability, and intelligence to implement a complex solution to a seemingly 
insurmountable problem.  Sheltered under Ewing’s auspices, the author granted all the members 
of the PPA, including sharecroppers, inclusion in the better class.  The tobacco associations 
denied any involvement in the violence, but the author rejected this disclaimer as transparently 
untrue.  Instead, she explained that a lower class of unscrupulous “hill-billies” left the association 
no choice but violence when they sought to profit at their neighbors’ expense.  In her analysis, 
“However deplorable the loss of life and the destruction of property … the fact remains that it 
was only by the aid of night-riding that the farmers held their ground against the trust and the 
‘regie’ buyers.  No amount of determination would have enabled them to accomplish the desired 
result without violence.”
 
36
                                                 
34 “Patterson’s Speech,” undated news clipping. 
   
35 “Old Guard in Gray,” undated news clipping. 
36 Anna Youngman, "The Tobacco Pools of Kentucky and Tennessee," The Journal of Political Economy 
18, no. 1 (January 1910): 47. 
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Patterson fancied himself a friend of progressive agriculture and believed the PPA 
promised a model of agricultural productivity.  As Waldrep demonstrated, the PPA’s leadership 
“was dominated by tobacco planters whose status was inherited from their ante-bellum 
slaveowning ancestors.”37  The organization had widespread popular support.  Tennessee 
Congressional Representative John Wesley Gaines made his career through support of 
agriculture and the PPA’s efforts to raise the price of tobacco, even defending the PPA and their 
tactics on the floor of the United States Senate.38
Patterson’s choice to forego intervention against the PPA was hardly reflective of his 
approach to governance as a whole.  By the end of his first term, the legislature had appropriated 
funding to repair the Capitol Building, purchase a Capitol annex, and purchase, furnish, and 
maintain an executive mansion.  The governor proudly reported that the state militia was better 
equipped than ever before.  In just two years, the structures of state power had received the 
attention Patterson believed the state of Tennessee deserved.
  Just across the state line in Kentucky, a 
Republican governor busily demonstrated the limits of state power through his own ineffectual 
efforts to suppress the uprising.  Patterson, on the other hand, intervened as little as possible.  His 
statement against the destruction of property bowed to the advocates of law and order but 
omitted any reference to other coercive tactics or the PPA in general. 
39
The new governor could also point to substantial movement on many of the Progressive 
reforms that were the foundation of his platform.  Education reform proceeded largely as 
Patterson had outlined in his opening address to the General Assembly, leading Patterson to 
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boast, “My recommendations on this subject were substantially enacted into law.”40  The 
governor claimed similar victories for insurance reform, labor laws and a state food and drug law 
that complemented federal legislation.  Patterson even bragged that Tennessee’s exemplary 
action on insurance reform led West Virginia to “incorporate into her law the insurance laws of 
Tennessee.”41
As governor, Patterson moved to implement electoral reforms aimed to dismantle the 
mechanisms of machine politics that he had attacked during the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary.  Patterson proposed removing local electoral commissions from the hands of the 
governor entirely, but some legislators resisted.  Instead, Patterson and the legislature 
compromised, agreeing to remove direct local appointments from the hands of the governor and 
place that power in the hands of a three-man commission appointed by the governor.  Additional 
legislation aimed to purify elections and reduce fraud, and Patterson credited these changes with 
eliminating charges of electoral fraud in Memphis, Chattanooga, and Knoxville.  Although 
electoral reform did not take the form Patterson originally proposed, the governor claimed the 
result as a victory.
  
42
Agricultural education also received a substantial boost during Patterson’s first term.  The 
legislature provided for the creation of a new agricultural hall at the University of Tennessee, 
funded an agricultural fair in Nashville, and passed legislation to address the regulation of animal 
feed and the prevention of communicable diseases among livestock.  In 1908, Patterson 
announced that an experiment station in West Tennessee was scheduled to open as soon as 
   
                                                 
40 “Opening Speech of Governor Malcolm Patterson,” April 11, 1908. 
41 “Opening Speech of Governor Malcolm Patterson,” April 11, 1908. 
42 “Opening Speech of Governor Malcolm Patterson,” April 11, 1908. 
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January of 1909.  As the governor saw it, scientific farming in Tennessee had become a “signal 
success.”43
The governor could claim substantial progress toward a number of long-term goals, but 
there were aspects of his platform that the legislature either addressed insufficiently or failed to 
address at all.  Although Patterson organized a commission to explore possible sites for a new 
juvenile detention facility, the legislative appropriation of $10,000 was insufficient to fund the 
project.  Patterson was unable to organize even a Good Roads Commission, leaving road 
construction in the hands of local officials who he believed were inefficient and disorganized.   
  
During his first gubernatorial address to the General Assembly, Patterson stressed the 
importance of enacting fish, game, and forest conservation laws.  He specifically requested 
legislation to incite interest in conservation, preservation, and reforestation.  Patterson felt that he 
lacked sufficient information to recommend specific legislation, but feared that “the time will 
soon come, if it is not already here, when the constant destruction of trees without replacement 
will make it necessary for the State to acquire large tracts of land for reforesting.”44  Patterson 
regarded the legislature’s response as mixed.  He allowed that the laws enacted by the General 
Assembly “may not be all that is desirable,” but nonetheless regarded the legislation as a 
“distinct advance” over previous conditions.45
Rather than seeking to preserve, conserve, replenish, or reforest, Patterson’s fish, game, 
and conservation initiatives sought primarily to limit the gross destruction of natural resources.  
  To reduce forest fires, the legislature required the 
clearing of brush along railroad right of ways.  Other laws established the state’s first fishing law 
and expanded existing game restrictions.   
                                                 
43 “Opening Speech of Governor Malcolm Patterson,” April 11, 1908. 
44 Malcolm R. Patterson, Message to the Fifty-Fifth Assembly, 10. 
45 “Opening Speech of Governor Malcolm Patterson,” April 11, 1908, 7. 
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While limited in scope, the laws expanded the state’s involvement in conservation.  Patterson 
acknowledged the progress, but held that the state needed to do more.  In fact, Patterson accused 
the state itself of polluting waterways even while imposing pollution restrictions on individuals.  
The General Assembly had been surprisingly amenable to Patterson’s platform, but by the end of 
1908, Tennessee had made relatively little progress toward advancing Gifford Pinchot’s goal of 
preservation and reforestation.   
Malcolm Patterson actively discussed bringing Tennessee into the national conservation 
movement, and he knew the area around Reelfoot Lake well enough to be sure that the lake held 
appeal for both recreation and conservation.  Since his days as a Tenth District congressional 
representative, Patterson had advocated cotton as the cornerstone of Tennessee’s agricultural 
economy; given his interest in the state’s cotton production, he was certainly aware of Lake 
County’s exploding cotton economy.  On December 7, 1907, Patterson married his third wife, 
Mary Russell Gardner of Union City, at her family’s home in Obion County.  The Patterson 
family even used letterhead from a Union City company as notepaper.46  In line with the 
Democratic declaration that the lakes and forests of the state were the property of the people that 
“should be kept for the use and enjoyment of all,” Patterson invited his political supporters from 
Memphis to a Fourth of July barbecue on the beach at Reelfoot Lake.47
In addition to his personal connections to the region, Patterson visited Obion County in 
June of 1908, during the night rider violence.  Early in 1908, Carmack announced that he would 
   
                                                 
46 Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance Company Letterhead, undated, Malcolm Rice Patterson Papers, acc. 
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47 “The Platform Adopted by the Democrats of Tennessee in Convention,” July 14, 1908, Malcolm Rice 
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challenge Patterson for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.  The nominees agreed to hold 
a series of 50 debates across the state between April and June.  Carmack and Patterson shared 
similar platforms, but as the challenger, Carmack needed to differentiate himself from the 
incumbent.  Patterson supported local option voting on prohibition; Carmack became a vocal 
supporter of statewide prohibition, garnering the support of the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union.  Prohibition became the central issue in the acrimonious primary contest.  The bitter 
exchanges between Carmack and Patterson drew large crowds.  Fights broke out among the 
crowds at some debates and, during the debate in Fayetteville, Carmack tried to attack 
Patterson.48  On June 4, 1908, almost two months after night riders burned Burdick’s fish docks 
at Reelfoot Lake, Malcolm Patterson debated Edward Ward Carmack in Obion County.49
Although Patterson’s support was centered in the urban areas of the state, his supporters 
worked diligently to scrape away at Carmack’s rural appeal.  In Obion County, the embers of 
Populist revolt still smoldered in the former hotbed of agrarian unrest.  During the agrarian 
revolt, Carmack had led the Democratic editorial assault on agrarian politicians, particularly 
targeting John H. McDowell’s appointment as coal oil inspector by Governor Buchanan.  
McDowell was the hardest hit politician in a statewide assault that struck almost every agrarian 
representative.  Particularly in Obion County, Patterson’s supporters hammered Carmack with 
his own earlier positions.  Judge Felix W. Moore reminded voters that Carmack “gained 
notoriety in this State fifteen years ago while editor of the American by abusing” John McDowell 
and, as recently as the Democratic Convention of 1904, “it was reported that he abused William 
   
                                                 
48 William R. Majors, Editorial Wild Oats: Edward Ward Carmack and Tennessee Politics (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 1984), 130.  
49 “Hickman Has Patterson Club,” The Hickman Courier, June 5, 1908, 6. 
 104 
 
J. Bryan to such an extent that it was difficult to prevent serious trouble.”50
Both candidates attempted to profit from Bob Taylor’s popularity.  Carmack quoted 
Taylor during the campaign and some Carmack supporters believed Taylor might become a 
vocal supporter of the challenger.
  Initially printed in 
the Obion Democrat, Moore’s letter was picked up by other newspapers before Patterson’s 
campaign printed and distributed it as a campaign circular. 
51  Although Taylor largely stayed away from the election, he 
announced, “I want no friend of mine to vote against Governor Patterson.”52  “Pattersonian 
Democracy,” another campaign piece originating in Obion County, ridiculed Carmack for 
“quoting an interview with Taylor in an effort to help his failing fortunes” and reminded voters 
that Carmack had “vilely” abused Taylor in the past. 53  In answer to Carmack’s apparent change 
of heart, Patterson’s supporters invoked the editor’s earlier attacks on Taylor, the Farmer’s 
Alliance, William Jennings Bryan, and John McDowell.  Patterson’s supporters scoffed at 
Carmack’s apparent hypocrisy.  One author confidently concluded, “ninety per cent of the 
Democrats who supported Taylor… are Patterson’s supporters, and they can not be driven or 
tolled away.” 54  As anticipated, Patterson won the June primary, although Carmack performed 
better than anticipated, carrying much of East Tennessee.55
Even if the busy primary election distracted the governor from the rising vigilantism 
around Reelfoot Lake, he had secured the nomination by August, when citizens from Lake 
 
                                                 
50 Felix Moore, “Patterson vs. Carmack: Appeal to Reason,” March 25, 1908, 8, Malcolm Rice Patterson 
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County appealed directly to him for aid protecting their black laborers.  In 1907, when Patterson 
suggested the PPA as an agricultural model for cotton producers, he almost certainly meant that 
cotton growers could benefit from adopting a structure similar to the one envisioned by Felix 
Ewing.  Unfortunately for Patterson, to a widely supportive public the PPA encompassed both 
the aristocratically controlled organization that Ewing imagined and the unrestrained vigilantism 
that PPA night riders actualized.  
“Democrats needed the symbolic support of the old agrarian radicals,” wrote Connie 
Lester and, during both his initial campaign and the primary contest with Carmack, Malcolm 
Patterson and his supporters did everything possible to ensure that Patterson was the Democrat 
who voters regarded as the inheritor of the agrarian reform impulse.56  Patterson adopted 
agrarian rhetoric, associated himself with Bob Taylor, appeared in public with former Alliance 
leader and Tennessee governor John Buchanan, and circulated publications that reminded voters 
of his opponents’ previous attacks on agrarian reformers.57
Across the South, when African Americans entered an economic system previously 
dominated by white smallholders, whites often responded with violence.  William F. Holmes’ 
research suggests that the smallholders who comprised the bulk of the Farmers’ Alliance’s 
membership were more conservative than many interpretations of the later Populist movement 
  The PPA had wide public support, 
and Patterson believed cotton producers could emulate aristocratic planter Felix Ewing’s model 
to increase cotton profits.  Instead, residents around Reelfoot Lake turned the tactics developed 
by the PPA’s enforcement wing against the large landowners whose cotton production was 
reshaping the northwest corner of Tennessee.  
                                                 
56 Lester, Mudsills, 207. 
57 J. M. Shahan, “Rhetoric of Reform: The 1906 Gubernatorial Race in Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly 35, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 68-69. 
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implied, particularly on issues of race.  In Georgia, as in Tennessee, when Alliance 
representatives joined the state legislature, they voted along Democratic Party lines.58  William 
Holmes’ research into the decline of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance revealed that when blacks 
threatened “white’s economic domination, they could expect determined and, quite likely, 
violent opposition.”59  Between September 1 and 5, 1889, whites murdered at least twenty-five 
African Americans during a violent campaign in Leflore County, Mississippi, effectively 
shutting down the county’s Colored Farmers’ Alliance.  State officials, including Mississippi 
Governor Lowry, were aware of the violence, but made no move to intervene in the massacre.  
Holmes suggested that the death toll would have been even higher, but black laborers received 
protection from the white planters who depended on their labor during cotton harvest.60  In both 
Mississippi and Georgia, smallholders within the Southern Alliance offered the most determined 
opposition to the efforts of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance to improve conditions among African 
American farm laborers.61
During the 1908 night rider violence at Reelfoot Lake, Patterson was busily courting 
Tennessee’s white rural smallholders.  In the governor’s mind, cotton was an enduring concern, 
but the African American farm laborers who picked that cotton were not.  African Americans 
had been effectively (and to Patterson’s mind, rightly) disfranchised by the turn of the twentieth 
century.  Black migration from farms to cities had not yet begun in earnest, but planters and 
politicians, including Bob Taylor, recognized the threat that urban industrial opportunities posed 
   
                                                 
58 William F. Holmes, "The Southern Farmers' Alliance and the Georgia Senatorial Election of 1890." The 
Journal of Southern History 50, no. 2 (May 1984): 197-224. 
59 William F. Holmes, "The Demise of the Colored Farmers' Alliance," The Journal of Southern History 41, 
no. 2 (May 1975): 200. 
60 William F. Holmes, "The Leflore County Massacre and the Demise of the Colored Farmers' Alliance," 
Phylon 34, no. 3 (3rd Qtr. 1960): 273. 
61 Holmes, “Demise,” 199-200. 
 107 
 
to the existing labor model.  The Alliance had dissolved, but Patterson was actively pursuing the 
rural voters who had formed the bulk of its membership, the same constituency who had nurtured 
resistance to the Colored Farmers’ Alliance’s efforts in other parts of the South.   
Patterson’s failure to respond to Lake County’s appeal for aid protecting their African 
American workers served the governor’s interests.  First, had Patterson intervened, he risked 
alienating the rural smallholders who were most attracted to the rhetoric of agrarian reform, a 
group that Patterson and his supporters believed could provide the essential margin for victory in 
a close election.  Second, a free and mobile black labor force threatened cotton production, 
which Patterson earnestly believed was the heart of Tennessee’s wealth and prosperity.  As their 
petition made clear, Lake County landowners had already launched a widespread effort to protect 
the African American laborers who picked their cotton.  Where Lake County landlords perceived 
a threat to their labor force, Patterson may well have seen labor insurance.   
When the threat of indiscriminate violence forced African Americans to choose between 
relying on their own resources and fleeing to the protection of a paternalistic landlord, laborers 
often opted for the protective auspices of a landowner who needed their labor.  In the words of 
C. Vann Woodward, it was not adoration for upper-class southerners that led African Americans 
to turn to landlords for protection “but the hot breath of cracker fanaticism they felt on the back 
of their necks.”62
                                                 
62 Woodward, Strange Career, 51. 
  With Lake County landlords already actively intervening to protect their labor 
force, Patterson may have believed the situation around Reelfoot Lake ensured Lake County’s 
landlords a more reliable and loyal labor force than cotton producers elsewhere in the state, 
where the potential consequences were less dire for workers who opted to leave an established 
 108 
 
labor arrangement.  Malcolm Patterson may have been an urban Progressive, but both he and his 
supporters worked to make Patterson palatable to smallholders and rural voters.  Despite his ties 
to the region and his intense interest in cotton production, when Lake County’s residents asked 
him for help, he refused.   
The situation changed dramatically on October 20, 1908.  Captain Quentin Rankin was 
dead.  Although Colonel Robert Z. Taylor was actually making his way across Reelfoot Lake to 
Lake County, he was presumed dead as well.  When the night riders committed this breach of the 
established racial boundary, Patterson responded with an immediate and unprecedented display 
of power and authority.   
Tobacco night rider violence had generated news coverage, but Rankin’s murder held 
special appeal.  A midnight assault on prominent white men, Rankin’s dastardly murder, 
Taylor’s daring escape, and Malcolm Patterson’s forceful response transformed rote reports of 
violence into newspaper gold.  Reporters who traveled to Reelfoot had much to report.  Hillsman 
Taylor summoned the Vanderbilt football team and several members arrived at Reelfoot Lake to 
aid the state militia as they combed the swamps for Taylor’s attackers.63
The media portrayal of Patterson’s response to Rankin’s murder was overwhelmingly 
positive.  When opening his campaign for re-election, Patterson exhorted Democrats to 
remember that Republican hopes for success hinged on “the supposed disaffection in the 
  For his part, Robert Z. 
Taylor readily detailed his ordeal for the media.  Malcolm Patterson cancelled campaign 
appearances, but the media interest in the case provided the governor with many opportunities to 
issue public statements.   
                                                 
63 “Collegians Chase Outlaws,” The Sun (NY), October 25, 1908, 10. 
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Democratic Party.”64  Patterson’s supporters praised the governor for sacrificing his campaign in 
order to suppress lawlessness, proclaiming, “The people will run the Governor’s campaign for 
him” while he tended the state’s business.65  News accounts portrayed Patterson fearlessly 
leading the charge against the night riders, despite threats to himself and his family.  Writers 
praised Patterson for his valor, compared him to Napoleon, and offered him up as an example to 
other governors.66
Overall, Governor Patterson benefited from the coverage of the violence at Reelfoot 
Lake, but not all editors completely abandoned criticism of Tennessee’s governor.  Patterson’s 
opponents cast his response to the night rider violence as pure political opportunism.  One writer 
reminded readers that Patterson had deliberately ignored lawlessness in the tobacco district, 
where men of status and money condoned violence.  He sarcastically informed readers that 
although Patterson was “heedless of the complaints from Clarksville and other night rider 
infested communities,” following Rankin’s death, the governor “has suddenly heard that there 
are night riders in Tennessee.”  He explained that Reelfoot did not pose the same problems as 
tobacco night riding because “no one but poor, ignorant fishermen are implicated, [so Patterson] 
is perfectly safe in making a big show with his soldiers there.  They probably marched into that 
section ‘battalion front,’ driving the rabbits before them.”
  Patterson easily defeated his Republican opponent in the general election. 
67
Although condemnation of Rankin’s murder was almost universal in news reports, even 
newspapers from other states maintained sympathy for the night riders while deploring their 
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methods.  The Ocala Banner characterized Rankin’s tragic murder as the result of “an ugly state 
of lawlessness in which the right is not all on one side.”68  The editor of a Missouri newspaper 
wrote, “All this trouble is over the killing of a rich lawyer named Rankin who sold out his clients 
– the farmers around Reelfoot Lake.”  He explained that Patterson had responded with “the 
wholesale arrest of farmers by the military.”  In conclusion, the editor quipped, “Mind you, this 
is not in Russia, but in ‘free’ America where ‘the peepul’ rule.”69
Patterson knew that some people believed there was more to the violence at Reelfoot than 
fishing rights.  A man who identified himself as RCW wrote the Nashville American and made 
clear that more was at stake than news articles suggested.  RCW wrote that many people had 
condoned earlier lawlessness “for selfish reasons.”  Even after Rankin’s death, there were people 
who “excuse the lawlessness of the cotton growing night riders, suggesting that their demands 
should be acceded to and some concerted action taken to keep up the price of cotton.”  RCW 
indignantly declared that sympathy with the night riders was folly and asked, “If the price of 
tobacco and cotton is to be kept up by threat and intimidation why not corn and wheat and 
merchandise?”
   
70
For readers far outside of Tennessee’s cotton and tobacco markets, the incident at 
Reelfoot Lake offered a compelling cautionary tale about the power of private trusts and the loss 
of public resources.  Shortly after Rankin’s murder, newspapers in Florida and California carried 
  RCW supported Patterson’s position, but he also directly connected the recent 
violence to cotton markets.  Malcolm Patterson clipped the article for his personal file.  
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articles comparing members of the West Tennessee Land Company to European feudal lords.71  
Florida newspapers directly framed Rankin’s murder as a call for conservation: “Let us get 
together and buy a million acres of pine lands for a common game and fish preserve, open to 
every citizen of Florida forever, let us forbid Governor Broward from selling another acre of the 
state lands but keep it for a holiday and picnic ground.”72
The racially charged violence that dominated the night riders’ actions throughout the 
summer largely disappeared in newspaper accounts of the attack on Rankin and Taylor.  
Newspapers across the country identified Rankin’s murder as a resurgence of the violence that 
erupted almost a year earlier, with the destruction of Burdick’s fish docks.  Occasional references 
to racial violence slipped into coverage of Rankin’s murder and the state investigation.  For 
instance, one account identified the violence at Reelfoot as “an outgrowth of a controversy” over 
fishing rights at the lake, while presenting the massacre of the Walker family as evidence of the 
night riders’ “desperate character.”
   
73  When night rider Tid Burton confessed and turned state’s 
evidence, he admitted to involvement in the attack on George Wynne earlier in the summer.  An 
Arizona newspaper reported that Tid Burton confessed to whipping a prominent white man but 
failed to mention that the night riders targeted Wynne because he made an unfavorable 
comparison between the members of the band and African American laborers.74
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  The majority of 
news coverage included no references to the summer of violence preceding Rankin’s murder.  
Most newspapers simply pointed to Rankin’s murder as an egregious escalation of the dispute 
72 “Let Us Save a Little,” The Ocala Banner, October 30, 1908, 4.  
73 “Judge Escapes From Riders,” The Mexico Missouri Message, October 29, 1908, 2. 
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concerning ownership of Reelfoot Lake and referenced the earlier attack on Burdick.75  
Following Rankin’s murder, even The Hickman Courier, which had covered violence at Reelfoot 
throughout the summer, reported, “The last trouble in the lake district was in the spring.”76
As the readers and editors of The Hickman Courier were fully aware, there had been 
trouble around the lake all summer, but, in the wake of Rankin’s murder, the only violence that 
mattered in news reports was violence against whites.  Almost all accounts, including Taylor’s 
statement to reporters, emphasized that Rankin and Taylor guilelessly accompanied their 
abductors, believing they would be threatened and set free.  Most newspapers were satisfied with 
decrying Rankin’s murder, characterizing the attack as a lynching or describing the attack in 
detail and permitting their readers to draw their own conclusions.   
 
While many newspapers trusted their readership to draw inferences from implicit 
references, one Kentucky newspaper outlined explicitly what set Rankin’s murder apart.  
According to the writer, Rankin and Taylor did not resist because they “could not conceive of 
such a thing as men of their prominence being hanged and shot like dogs by men of their own 
color.”77
                                                 
75 “Night Riders Slay Lawyers,” The Bee (Earlington, KY) October 22, 1908, 1; “Father of Paducah 
Woman Murdered By Night Riders Near Reelfoot Lake, Tenn,” The Paducah Evening Sun, October 20, 1908, 1; 
“Night Riders Murder,” The Muskogee Cimeter (OK), October 30, 1908, 7; “A Band of Assassins,” Ocala Evening 
Sun, October 21, 1908, 2. 
 Before Rankin’s murder, the night riders had destroyed white men’s property, 
intimidated African American laborers, attacked prominent white men, and murdered an entire 
African American family.  None of these crimes generated the unprecedented interest and 
outrage that accompanied Rankin’s murder.   
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Race lay at the core of the public response to Rankin’s death.  Public sentiment could not 
tolerate this type of violence directed at prominent white men.  The attack on George Wynne 
prompted a response within Lake County but failed to generate much interest beyond the 
community.  In his own account, Robert Z. Taylor stated that he and Rankin assumed that the 
night riders intended to whip them and that they accompanied their abductors willingly.  The 
night riders had whipped a number of other white people over the course of the summer and, 
when the night riders rousted Rankin and Taylor from their beds at Walnut Log, both men 
grudgingly submitted to their anticipated punishment.  Even Taylor and Rankin apparently 
accepted whipping as a form of community coercion that white men might legitimately 
perpetrate on other white men, but lynching was another matter entirely.  Taylor, Rankin, and 
newspaper writers who echoed Taylor’s surprise believed race and status protected white men 
from being tortured and murdered by other white men, regardless of their supposed offense.  The 
night riders subjected Taylor and Rankin to the sort of extralegal violence reserved for black 
men.   
For an urban Progressive who had risen to office by exploiting a schism within 
Tennessee’s Democratic Party and casting himself as the inheritor of agrarian reform, the murder 
of Captain Rankin presented a potentially catastrophic conundrum.  Patterson advocated the 
PPA’s aristocratically led organization as a model for other farmers, even tolerating night rider 
violence conducted under the PPA’s auspices.  Even when residents around Reelfoot Lake 
dispensed with the aristocratic leadership and adopted only the PPA’s vigilante tactics, Patterson 
refused to send state resources to bolster Lake County landlords’ efforts to protect their African 
American laborers.  Patterson consistently courted rural voters and steadfastly avoided positions 
that risked alienating small farmers.  In Patterson’s mind, attacks against African Americans and 
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restrained violence against other whites were understandable, but lynching a prominent white 
man displayed a blatant disregard for the privileges afforded by race and class.  In response, 
Patterson crushed the night riders beneath the full force of Tennessee’s authority.  
The racial and agricultural issues around Reelfoot Lake were as gnarled and tangled as 
the lake itself.  While market conditions pinched small farmers across the state, Judge Harris and 
other Lake County landlords extracted vast wealth from a growing African American labor force.  
Just across the lake, Obion’s white residents believed the expanding cotton economy threatened 
their economic rights.  As a large black labor force freed wealthy landowners from dependence 
on white wage labor, wealthier landowners no longer required the goodwill of poorer whites.  
Earlier, landowners had relented to community pressure against enforcing private control of the 
lake, but unwanted wage laborers lost the advantage that the need for a large labor force had 
traditionally given them.  Landowners with a plentiful black labor force were free to pursue their 
own economic self-interest without fear of reprisals from the white community, and the lake 
became fair game.  In light of the ongoing agricultural shifts, the violence at Reelfoot presented 
not a targeted response to the loss of fishing rights, but the final skirmish in an ongoing class 
struggle between groups whose traditional bonds had completely broken down.   
Rankin’s lynching demanded action, but the agricultural foundations of the violence 
around Reelfoot Lake threatened to put Malcolm Patterson’s agrarian-friendly image into direct 
conflict with his interest in expanding cotton markets.  For Patterson, neither side of the 
agricultural dispute offered a winning political position.  The conservation of the state’s public 
resources, however, was an imminently defensible position.  Acquiring Reelfoot Lake as a state 
game preserve made political sense.  Patterson had already pressed the state legislature to take 
action to conserve the state’s resources, he had discussed a plan for establishing forest reserves in 
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Tennessee, and the state Democratic Party platform included a declaration that the forests and 
streams of Tennessee belonged to the people.  Patterson had led a caravan of Memphis 
supporters on a recreational outing to Reelfoot Lake.  For these urban voters, the lake 
represented neither a potential source of supplemental income nor the final battleground in an 
ongoing conflict between traditional access rights and private ownership.  Patterson’s urban base 
valued Reelfoot Lake’s potential as a recreational escape for city dwellers looking for rural 
regeneration.   
With the West Tennessee Land Company disentangled from the agricultural changes 
wrought by James C. Harris and Judge Harris, the company became just another trust run amok.  
Patterson responded to Rankin’s death with unprecedented force but also immediately pointed to 
Reelfoot Lake as an example of the peril of the monopolization of public resources and 
advocated the creation of a public game and fish preserve as a prophylactic against future 
depredations.  From his command center at Reelfoot Lake, Malcolm Patterson transformed into a 
valiant, trust-busting conservationist.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In a 1925 address to Tennessee’s General Assembly, Tennessee Governor Austin Peay 
wrote, “We should forthwith establish a system of State parks and forests.  …  Reelfoot Lake in 
West Tennessee, is a great natural asset…  It should be perpetuated for the pleasure and 
recreation of the people through all time.”1  In seeking to establish a state park system, Governor 
Peay attempted to resolve the disputes over ownership of Reelfoot Lake that had plagued the 
State of Tennessee since 1908, when his one-time political ally, Governor Malcolm Patterson, 
initiated the state acquisition of Reelfoot Lake.2
In the immediate aftermath of Quentin Rankin’s death, Governor Patterson successfully 
turned the violence around Reelfoot Lake to his political advantage, but his triumph was short-
lived.  On November 8, 1908, Robin Cooper, the son of Patterson’s close associate Duncan 
Brown Cooper, shot Edward Ward Carmack dead on a street in downtown Nashville.  Carmack 
had relentlessly printed personal attacks against Duncan Cooper.  On November 8, Duncan, 
accompanied by his son, angrily accosted Carmack.  Carmack opened fire, hitting Robin.  Robin 
returned fire, killing Carmack.  When Carmack’s coffin left Nashville for Columbia, Tennessee, 
the Women’s Christian Temperance Union gathered at the Nashville train station.  After the train 
left, Dr. Ira Landrith spoke to the women gathered at the station, pleading that “the blood of ex-
Senator Carmack must be as productive as the blood of the martyrs of old.”
   
3
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In the wake of Carmack’s death, the large-scale military operation at Reelfoot Lake 
suddenly seemed less like a model for suppressing lawlessness and more like evidence that 
lawlessness was even more pervasive in Tennessee than in other southern states.  As the 
Washington Times reported, “Tennessee, already plunged into the gloom of feud and 
assassination” was rocked by Carmack’s murder.  In Los Angeles and San Francisco, 
newspapers reported that “conditions [were] such that the commonwealth of Tennessee [was] 
placed on trial before the world as accessory to murder.”4  The Memphis News Scimitar accused 
Patterson of attempting to shield the Coopers and called for the governor’s impeachment; New 
York’s The Sun printed the News Scimitar’s accusation.5
Following Carmack’s murder, Patterson lost the political advantages he had acquired 
while leading the charge against the night riders, but he had successfully restored the divisions of 
race and class in northwest Tennessee.  On November 23, 1908, a mob lynched three African 
American brothers, Marshall, Edward, and Jim Stinebeck, at Tiptonville in Lake County.  The 
previous day, on the way to respond to a call that the three brothers were causing a disturbance at 
an African American church, Lake County Sheriff John Hall deputized Richard Burruss.  An 
altercation erupted when Hall and Burruss confronted the Stinebecks outside of the church and 
one of the brothers shot them both, killing Burruss and seriously injuring Hall.  The three men 
  The Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union and other prohibitionists succeeded in converting Carmack into a martyr for their cause.  
In January of 1909, the Tennessee General Assembly voted to prohibit alcohol in Tennessee.  
Despite Patterson’s long list of Progressive victories, after Carmack’s death, prohibition became 
Tennessee’s defining Progressive reform. 
                                                 
4 “Commonwealth is to Blame for Growth of Lawlessness,” The Los Angeles Herald, November 28, 1908, 
4; “Tennessee on Trial,” The San Francisco Call, November 13, 1908, 6. 
5 “Ex-Senator Carmack Buried,” The Sun (NY), November 12, 1908, 3. 
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escaped but were captured early the next day.  J. L. Burnette convinced the mob to delay the 
lynching until nightfall, so that a sheriff and judge could organize an impromptu trial that would 
condone the lynching.  After the men were condemned, the mob hung all three men from the 
rafters of the African American church.6
Patterson attempted to prevent the lynching, but the militia arrived too late.  The governor 
clarified that he moved to intervene not because he “didn’t believe that the negroes deserved to 
die” but because he hoped to avoid the appearance of lawlessness.  For Patterson, the lynching in 
Lake County was not actually lawlessness at all.  Patterson explained, “Now, that act has got to 
be differentiated from an act of lawlessness by organized mobs, because that act was the act of 
infuriated white men against negroes who had murdered white men in cold blood, and that is 
likely to occur at any time.”  Although Patterson perceived Rankin’s murder as an unjust and 
unjustified act, he refused to admit that the lynching of three black men was the same ethically or 
morally.  In Patterson’s words, “When we kill a negro in the South for a nameless crime against 
our civilization and the purity of our women, we don’t visit punishment upon the innocent.  If we 
happen to form a mob and kill a negro for a murder such as was committed in Lake County, we 
don’t follow it by burning their houses.”  Patterson presented the targeted nature of the lynchings 
as a credit to southern restraint.  In Patterson’s view, the Stinebeck lynching was nothing like 
Rankin’s murder.  Following forceful state intervention, residents around Reelfoot Lake were 
once again venting their rage at poor blacks.  The night riders were quiet, Rankin’s accused 
killers were awaiting trial and, in Lake County, three black men hung from the rafters of an 
African American church, lynched for a crime that only one man committed.  Indeed, the mob in 
   
                                                 
6 “Three Negroes Hanged by Mob in Tennessee,” Los Angeles Herald, November 25, 1908, 2. 
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Lake County did not burn the church after lynching the Stinebecks.  Two doctors asked them not 
to burn the building because fire would have threatened a barn belonging to a bed-ridden white 
man who lived nearby.  Instead, the community leaders who organized the lynching left the 
lights burning and the church doors open so that the men’s silhouettes were visible from the 
street.7
In April 1910, Malcolm Patterson pardoned Duncan Brown Cooper and sealed his own 
political fate.  Patterson successfully fended off Carmack’s attacks while his opponent lived, but 
he could not defeat a martyr.  Nonetheless, Patterson insisted on announcing for a third term.  In 
his nomination speech, Patterson invoked his successful suppression of lawlessness at Reelfoot 
Lake, but he could not overcome the political damage of Carmack’s murder and the pardon of 
Duncan Cooper.  The Democratic Party attempted to salvage the race by substituting Robert L. 
Taylor at the last minute, but it was too late.  Carmack’s death had irrevocably divided the 
Democratic Party.  Not even “Our Bob” could overcome the taint of murder and collusion 
surrounding the gubernatorial election.  Republican Ben Hooper won the election, placing 
Tennessee’s governorship in the hands of the Republicans for the first time since 1880. 
   
Carmack’s death and Patterson’s defeat rerouted Progressive reform in Tennessee, but the 
narrative surrounding Reelfoot Lake was already established.  In February 1909, after the men 
were convicted and before those convictions were overturned, a bill was introduced to acquire 
                                                 
7 Abigail Rice Hyde, “1908 Incident at Keefe: Death of Dick Burrus” in Alfred Michael Franko, The Night 
Riders of Reelfoot Lake, TN, compiled by Winnie Mooney Hood and Arline Erwin Orr (n.p.: Lake County Historical 
Society, 2000), xii - xiii.  Hyde stressed that she wrote an account of the lynching to correct mistaken stories, which 
attributed the lynching to the night riders rather than to highly respected citizens of Lake County.  Hyde attributed 
the majority of her information on the event to a personal account provided by John Perry Moore, who as a 16 year-
old, climbed into the church’s rafters to pry loose one of the Stinebeck brother’s fingers from a joist that he grabbed 
when the mob first attempted to hang him.  Hyde concluded, “As far as the community was concerned, justice had 
been done.  It never occurred to anyone to think the night riders had been responsible.” 
 120 
 
the land around Reelfoot Lake as a game and fish preserve in the interest of public welfare.8  
Despite some opposing politicians who argued that the purchase rewarded the lawlessness at 
Reelfoot, the bill passed the house in April.9
Patterson’s conservation narrative diverted attention away from the potentially dangerous 
critique of the cotton economy and toward a popular Progressive program, but conservation 
rhetoric also helped limit the threat that dissatisfied residents could pose in the future.  Historians 
have demonstrated that Progressive Era projects targeting rural areas contained an inherent 
disdain for rural residents.  For instance, Charles Postel argued that the Commission on Country 
Life, which Theodore Roosevelt established to explore methods of improving farm life, 
dismissed farmers’ longstanding efforts to identify and rectify the challenges of rural life and 
presumed instead that rural residents’ problems required external technocratic intervention.
  The state spent decades unraveling the overlapping 
land claims to Reelfoot Lake, but within months of Rankin’s death the state legislature dedicated 
resources to acquiring the lake, an act that simultaneously legitimized Patterson’s conservation 
narrative and dismissed the night riders’ potentially troubling attacks on surrogate victims 
connected to Lake County’s expanding cotton economy.   
10  In 
his analysis of the Country Life Movement, William Bowers argued that the chairman of the 
commission, Liberty Hyde Bailey, “concluded that the chief problem [with rural life] was how to 
make farmers revere all things rural.”11
                                                 
8 “Reelfoot Lake Act,” The Hickman Courier, February 11, 1909, 1. 
  As Bowers’ observation suggests, the denigration of 
rural residents was embedded within Progressive movements for rural uplift, but these efforts 
also assumed that rural life was worth preserving.  Progressives worked to keep people in rural 
9 “Reelfoot Lake Bills,” Hopkinsville Kentuckian, April 9, 1909, 5. 
10 Charles Postel, The Populist Vision, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 282-287. 
11 William L Bowers, The Country Life Movement in America, 1900-1920 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat 
Press, 1974), 61.  
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settings through efforts like the Country Life Movement, but, through conservation efforts, 
Progressives worked to remove rural people from specific rural places.  As William Cronon 
found, conservationists and urbanites viewed rural residents as polluters of rural landscapes 
rather than producers who worked in rural areas.12
The night riders of Reelfoot Lake committed numerous violent atrocities, not benign 
violations.  By any definition, the night riders were outlaws, but after Rankin’s death, portrayals 
depicted all lake residents as squatters, despite the fact that Tennessee courts had repeatedly 
recognized locals’ cases against private ownership as legitimate claims under private property 
law.
  Karl Jacoby found that changes in 
conservation law transformed rural residents overnight from producers into squatters, poachers, 
and thieves.  This rhetorical transformation limited rural residents’ abilities to gain a public 
hearing.  As a result, Progressives conceived of rural residents as outlaws, defined new 
limitations on land use, and framed even longstanding and benign violations of these new rules 
as criminal behavior.  
13
                                                 
12 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in 
Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90; Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: 
Squatters, Poachers, and Thieves and the Hidden History of American Conservation, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001). 
  When the state legislature legitimized Patterson’s portrayal of the Reelfoot uprising as a 
conservation conflict, they simultaneously legitimized portrayals that depicted the residents 
around the lake as ignorant and backward.  As a result, the act of conservation served not only to 
divert attention from the night riders’ critique of the cotton economy but also to undercut 
13 “A Kappa Sigma Victim of Night Riders,” Caduceus of Kappa Sigma 23, no. 2 (November 1908): 101; 
“Collegians Chase Outlaws,” The Sun (NY), October 25, 1908, 10; “Judge Escapes From Riders,” The Montgomery 
Tribune, October 30, 1908, 3; “Are They Blind!,” Scott County Kicker (MO), November 7, 1908, 1; “Bloody Rule 
of Reelfoot Night Riders,” The Spokane Press, November 6, 1908, 7; “Long Standing Lawlessness,” Valentine 
Democrat, November 12, 1908, 3. 
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residents’ ability to gain a hearing for future critiques.  No reasonable urban Progressive would 
value the opinion of an ignorant, backward outlaw.   
Denigration of the residents around Reelfoot Lake contributed to the reestablishment of 
racial boundaries and shored up existing patterns of wealth and authority.  Patterson knew that 
the night riders targeted the cotton economy, but as long as they conducted their attacks within 
the boundaries of white supremacy, he trusted the existing patterns of wealth and authority to 
hold.  In Patterson’s mind, when the night riders lynched Rankin, they demonstrated a 
fundamental disregard for the racial boundaries that provided the foundation for the structure of 
wealth and power in Tennessee and enabled the purified electorate to enact all other Progressive 
reforms.  Fortunately for Patterson, the night rider violence toward whites focused on men 
connected with the West Tennessee Land Company.  By pursuing state ownership of Reelfoot 
Lake, Patterson framed himself as sympathetic to the residents around the lake even while he 
abhorred their lawlessness, tied the unrest at the lake to an existing plank of his political 
platform, and espoused a conservation philosophy that was ideologically appealing to his urban 
voter base.   
For distant proponents of conservation, the pressing agricultural conditions and racial 
violence that had plagued the area disappeared and the residents who became night riders were 
framed simply as backward locals who were intensely devoted to hunting and fishing.  In 1921, 
Nashville lawyer and conservationist Joseph Acklen recounted his experience traveling to the 
lake to enforce a federal migratory bird law.  Acklen characterized the night riders as “quaint” 
and related how he wooed them with alcohol and cigars, disarmed an angry mob with his 
knowledge of French and a glimpse of his .45 automatic, and ultimately persuaded them “to 
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respect the law, which promise, no doubt, they forgot the next day.”14
                                                 
14 International Association of Game, Fish and Conservation Commissioner, Proceedings of the Thirteenth 
Convention, Allentown, PA, Sept. 8 and 9, 1921, (New York: Greenhalgh Printing Company, [1921]), 
  Acklen’s self-inflated 
account stressed the dire warnings he received that natives at Reelfoot would respond violently 
to impositions on their hunting rights.  This account reveals the depth of misunderstanding 
regarding the events at Reelfoot Lake.  Within 13 years of the conflict, Acklen had framed the 
night riders as backwoods bumpkins who were ready to start a war when someone interfered 
with their fishing.  Acklen’s success in gaining local support for the migratory bird law likely 
had nothing to do with his charm.  Denial of the right to fish for profit at Reelfoot Lake was 
merely another setback among the economic pressures threatening small farmers around the lake.  
By the time the night riders formed at Reelfoot Lake, Judge Harris’ cotton empire had remade 
the region in ways that were disadvantageous to small farmers; the West Tennessee Land 
Company’s successful assertion of private ownership of the lake was yet another turn of the 
same screw that had been gradually squeezing smallholders for decades.  Acklen was never in 
danger during his time at Reelfoot Lake.  His cause was not tied to pervasive agricultural 
pressures, he held no connection to landlords like Judge Harris, and small farmers had no 
economic interest in migratory birds.  The conservation narrative of Reelfoot Lake created an 
enduring mythology of the night riders as rural champions of conservation, a mythology that 
purposefully neglected the economic motivations of small farmers living on the edge of a newly 
created cotton empire.  
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b2991621 (accessed September 10, 2012). 
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